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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. AIMS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis focuses on Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). It 
will be argued that Protocol III should be amended to take an effects based approach rather than a 
design based approach. There will be particular attention to the use of white phosphorus as a munition 
in contemporary warfare to reach this conclusion. Currently states are able to exploit the ambiguity in 
the law. By doing so, the principles and values of international humanitarian law (IHL) are threatened. 
IHL regulates the conduct of war and when doing this, there is an aim to minimise human suffering. 
To offer humanitarian protection, a set of rules are applied to limit the effects of armed conflict as 
much as possible. These principles are proportionality, necessity and the prohibition of unnecessary 
suffering.  The principles are upheld by treaties, conventions, customary law and general principles.
1
 
Like many aspects of law, there is legal ambiguity in the interpretation of some elements of IHL. 
When there is ambiguity, the basic principles of IHL can help. By looking at the core values of IHL, a 
certain direction is offered, and an interpretation can be made to follow these principles as much as 
possible.  The concept of stigma will also play a role throughout the thesis. Stigma can greatly impact 
how IHL deals with a munition and it will be shown that there are high levels of stigma related to 
white phosphorus. Because of this the best time to make an amendment would be now. There will be 
parallels made to other munitions which have had stigma and have resulted in IHL dealing with the 
munition.  
To reach this conclusion, many other possibilities will be explored to see if another change would be 
more suitable. There will be an exploration to see whether liability concerning white phosphorus 
needs to be expanded. Comparisons will be made to the case of Zyklon B.
2
 Drawing similarities and 
connections between white phosphorus and Zyklon B will help prove that Protocol III should be 
amended. It will be observed to see if the use of white phosphorus is stigmatised. The benefits of 
potentially expanding liability when white phosphorus is used in armed conflict will be assessed and it 
will be questioned to see if this is the best approach. In addition to this, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) will also be explored and it will be assessed to see if white phosphorus should fit 
within the scope of the convention. As white phosphorus is not classed as a chemical weapon, there 
will be consideration to see if any amendments to the CWC could strengthen the law surrounding 
white phosphorus. 
It should be noted that Protocol III of the CCW is an instrument of law that is based on incendiary 
weapons with which there is a strong stigma.
3
 One of the most recognisable images associated with 
armed conflict is the image of a girl named Phan Thị Kim Phúc running from a napalm strike on June 
8
th
 1972 during the Vietnam War.
 4
 The Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph captured the moment of 
the young girl running across a road naked, after being severely burned by the attack. Her clothes had 
been burned off, and it was later reported that she was ‘screaming and screaming’ as she ran.5 This 
image circulated the world and bought great media attention to incendiary weapons. 
This media attention bought a strong outcry with regards to incendiary weapons, and Protocol III is 
the instrument of IHL that deals with incendiary munitions. However this thesis will observe Protocol 
III only with regards to the white phosphorus munition. There will not be any focus on other multi-
purpose munitions or dual-use chemicals apart from white phosphorus and Zyklon B. White 
                                                          
1 Statue of the International Court of Justice, Art 38(1) 
2 re Tesch Zyklon B Case [1946] 1 Law Rep of Trials of War criminals 
3 Thomas Nash, ‘Statement by Article 36 to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons’ [2011] Article 36, 7 
4 Nick Ut, ‘The Terror of War’ Associated Press Photographer [1972] 
5 Michael Zhang, Interview with Nick Ut, Peta Pixel, 19th  September 2012  <http://petapixel.com/2012/09/19/interview-
with-nick-ut-the-photojournalist-who-shot-the-iconic-photo-napalm-girl/> accessed 6th October 2016 
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phosphorus will be the focus as it greatly illustrates how the protocol’s interpretation is capable of 
being exploited and how this exploitation leads to the use of the munition going against the principles 
of IHL. 
The concluding argument will aim to show a resolution to this issue. There will be an objective to 
offer an alternative that limits the chance for exploitation by states. The issues that will be presented 
will be shown to be alleviated if Protocol III is to change and have an effects based approach. Raising 
attention to Protocol III also offers the opportunity for others to comment and debate. After showing 
how Protocol III allows for states to exploit the law, and how changes would prevent this from 
happening, it will be demonstrated why an amendment would be beneficial. 
1.2. WHAT IS MEANT BY EFFECTS BASED APPROACH AND A DESIGN BASED 
APPROACH? 
It is important to show what will be defined as being ‘design based’ and ‘effects based.’ Looking 
simply at the dictionary definition of each word is not sufficient, but it is useful. It offers a good 
understanding of the words when they are isolated before they are observed in the context of Protocol 
III. Even though both are simple words, understanding completely the true definition is a good 
starting point. Effect is defined as a:  
‘Change which is a result or consequence of an action or cause.6’ 
This shows that there is need for a variation in the status quo that occurs because of a certain action. 
Design is defined as a: 
‘Purpose or planning that exists behind an action, fact or object.7’  
This leads to the need for a reason in which something is being created. But to truly define these 
phrases, attention to context will need to be made. This is important to do, as James Fry states: 
‘Historical lessons illustrate the principal need to evaluate the legality of weapons or methods 
of warfare in the context in which they are being applied rather than in abstract isolation.’8 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states the need for context and was drafted by 
the International Law Commission. The treaty deals with the international law on treaties between 
states. Article 31, under the heading 'general rule of interpretation' pays attention to the context of 
treaties. It states: 
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ 
The case of Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) deemed that Article 31 of the VCLT would 
be regarded as international customary law.
9
  This means that application of Article 31 is not 
dependant on whether a state is party to the treaty and it is binding to all. The importance of Article 31 
is highlighted and illustrates that the overall context of the treaty must be observed when interpreting 
parts of it at all times. Consequently, the interpretation of specific words such as design and effect 
must be done so in a way that fits within the purpose of the treaty. With this in mind, looking at where 
design and effect are found in treaties and conventions is useful. Protocol III of the CCW states an 
incendiary weapon needs to be:  
                                                          
6 The Oxford Popular Dictionary and Thesaurus [3rd edn, 1995] OUP 98 
7 ibid 82 
8 James D Fry, ‘Contextualised Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave Combat and International 
Humanitarian Law’ [2006] 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
9 The Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) Case [1999] paras 18-20 
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‘Primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action 
of flame, heat or a combination thereof.
10’   
Similarly, Article 2 of the CWC comments on munitions that are: 
‘Specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic 
chemicals.
11’ 
With regards to effect, Protocol I of the CCW states it is:  
‘Prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in 
the human body escape detection by X-rays.
12’ 
By showing in what context design and effect are used, a clearer understanding of what the words are 
meant to be interpreted as can be seen. Following this, when design is to be used in this thesis it will 
look into: 
 The manufacture of the munition and the reason why it was manufactured and originally 
made. It does not specifically look into how the munition is actually being used and what the 
consequences of the munition are 
When the definition of an effects based munition is to be used, the following are being considered: 
 The consequences of the munition once the weapon has been used 
 The nature of damage caused to any military object or civilian objects such as buildings, 
schools or hospitals 
 The damage that is caused to a person, where factors such as the severity of harm and the type 
of injury are deliberated 
Whenever effect or design is used in the context of Protocol III of the CCW or other conventions 
found in IHL this is what will be meant by them. There has been a consideration to areas of IHL that 
use these two words and they will be used in the same way for the remainder of the thesis. 
Effect and design have been defined and the thesis will argue that an effects based approach is best for 
this area of IHL. The damage and destruction that is probable from the use of white phosphorus is too 
great and outweighs the benefits that come from using the weapon. The objectives of IHL aim to limit 
the effects of war. This thesis will deem that armed conflict that involves white phosphorus can be 
regulated in a way that will limit these effects better. An effects based approach will focus on the 
consequences of the munition. There will be advancement from simply looking at the design, as this 
method does not regulate ‘incidental incendiary effects’ so does not offer sufficient protection. 
1.3. PRINCIPLES OF IHL 
The use of white phosphorus and its legality is a complex issue. It cannot simply be argued that white 
phosphorus kills people and therefore should be illegal. The status of IHL offers justifications and 
rationales for weapons and their use in armed conflict. It is important to first explain this legal 
framework so it can be shown how IHL works and how it applies to white phosphorus. A starting 
point would be to look at proportionality in attack. This principle can be found in many treaties in 
IHL. The Geneva Convention has four treaties with an additional three protocols. Together they 
                                                          
10Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Art 1(1) 
11Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Art 2 
12 Protocol I to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 
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establish the standards of international law and what the parties to the conflict must adhere to in war. 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention prohibits: 
‘An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
13
' 
Article 85 of the same protocol prohibits an indiscriminate attack that would affect: 
‘Civilian population or objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of 
life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.’14 
Additionally, the principle can be found pursuant to Article 8 of the 1998 International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Statute in which it states a war crime is committed when: 
'Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss 
of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
15
' 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has drafted a set of rules of customary laws for 
IHL. Each rule deals with a different specific issue. The principle of proportionality is regarded as 
customary international law through Rule 14 of the rules drafted by the ICRC.
16
 It applies to both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. Simply, an attack is regarded as illegal if it is 
launched when there is knowledge that there will be loss of life to civilians which is ‘clearly 
excessive’ in comparison to the overall military advantage gained from the attack. The principle itself 
offers a clear rationale, but its interpretation can be very complex. For example differing states view 
the notion of ‘military advantage’ in different ways.17 It is not explicitly stated whether this refers to 
the isolated attack itself, or at the larger picture which could refer to the outcome of the conflict as a 
whole.  
The United States dropping nuclear weapons on Japan shows how military advantage can be 
interpreted differently.  In 1945 and the final stages of World War II, the Japanese cities Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki were bombed resulting in a great number of casualties. Before discussing military 
advantage, the number of casualties will be shown by a set of tables. It will show the different causes 
of the deaths and from what distance away from the blasts people died. This will illustrate how the 
definition of effects is considered and it will help to create a clear understanding of what occurred as a 
result of the atomic bombs being deployed. Consequently, when the concept of military advantage is 
discussed, a clear picture of the effects that caused loss of life and injury to civilians will have been 
already noted. It will then be possible to balance this against the military advantage that was 
considered to be gained. There is great difficulty in attaining the exact number of causalities from the 
atomic bombings as there are not accurate figures of the population of the two cities prior to the 
attack. Consequently, the numbers that will be presented are only estimates. However they are figures 
estimated by the Manhattan Project which was a research and development project that produced the 
nuclear weapons that were used. 
                                                          
13Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, Art 51(5)(b) 
14Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, Art 85(3)(b) 
15The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [1998] Art 8(2)(b)(iv) 
16 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, Rule 14 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14> accessed 6th October 2016 
17ibid 
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Table A shows the number of casualties that occurred as a result of the atomic bombs being dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It reports that over half of the population of Hiroshima either died or 
were injured as a result of the atomic bomb and just under a third of the population of Nagasaki were 
either killed or injured.  
 Table A
18
 
 Hiroshima  Nagasaki  
Population before bombings  255,000  195,000  
Dead  66,000  39,000  
Injured  69,000  25,000  
Total Casualties  135,000  64,000 
 
Table B shows the different causes for the immediate deaths that happened as a result of the bombs. 
Because of the high level of effects of the weapon many of the deaths were a result of more than one 
specific effect and this can be seen by the percentages. It shows that the majority of deaths in both 
cities were a result of the victims being burned. Whilst there was an ample amount of deaths due to 
other factors, most died from being burned. 
Table B
19
 
 
 
Table C shows the amount of people that died in relevance to how far away from the initial blast they 
were. This helps illustrate the magnitude of the effects of the weapon as it could reach and affect 
people that were thousands of feet away. 
 Table C20 
Distance from X, 
feet  
Killed  Injured  Missing  Total 
Casualties  
Killed 
per square mile  
0 - 1,640  7,505  960  1,127  9,592  24,700  
1,640 - 3,300  3,688  1,478  1,799  6,965  4,040  
3,300 - 4,900  8,678  17,137  3,597  29,412  5,710  
4,900 - 6,550  221  11,958  28  12,207  125  
6,550 - 9,850  112  9,460  17  9,589  20  
                                                          
18 The Manhattan Engineer District, 'The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki' [1946] Trinity Atomic Website, 
accessed 6th October 2016 <http://www.abomb1.org/hiroshim/hiro_med.html> ; atmoicarchive.com, 'The Atomic Bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki' National Science Digital Library, accessed 6th October 2016 
<http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/MED/med_chp10.shtml> 
19 ibid 
20 ibid 
Hiroshima  
Cause of Death  Percentage of total died  
Burns  60%  
Falling debris  30% 
Other  10%   
Nagasaki  
Cause of Death  Percentage of total  died 
Burns  95%  
Falling debris  9%   
Flying glass  7%   
Other  7%   
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The effects of the nuclear bombs have been shown and these attacks remain the only use of nuclear 
weapons in armed conflict. August 6
th
 is when the United States dropped the atomic bomb over 
Hiroshima, and three days later the other bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. By August 15
th
, Japan 
announced that they were surrendering to the Allies which effectively signified the end of the Second 
World War. This series of events is an important illustration to the argument that views ‘military 
advantage’ in a way that refers to the conflict as a whole. Even though the weapon had devastating 
effects as shown by Tables A, B and C, that killed a lot of people and reached people that were 
thousands of feet away, there is still a legitimate argument that this was not excessive. There is no 
definitive answer as to what is considered to be military advantage and J. Samuel Walker states ‘the 
controversy over the use of the bomb seems certain to continue.
21’ 
There is an assertion that using the atomic bombs caused Japan to surrender which prevented 
casualties on both sides of the conflict on a bigger scale compared to what was reported. There was a 
planned invasion of Japan, and the bombings showed the potential of ‘prompt and utter destruction’ if 
Japan was not to surrender.
 22
 Without the bombings, the invasion would have taken place. 
Winston Churchill, the leader of the Opposition in August 1945 stated: 
‘There are voices which assert that the bomb should never have been used at all. I cannot 
associate myself with such ideas. I am surprised that very worthy people - but people who in 
most cases had no intention of proceeding to the Japanese front themselves - should adopt the 
position that rather than throw this bomb, we should have sacrificed a million American and a 
quarter of a million British lives.
23’ 
Churchill argues that dropping atomic bombs prevented a higher number of human casualties. The 
principle of proportionality prohibits an attack that is ‘excessive.’ On the surface, an attack with the 
magnitude of a nuclear weapon that had the effects that have been already noted would appear to be 
excessive. But this argument contends that the attack ended the war and stopped the need to wait for 
Japan to surrender. In addition, both cities had strategic significance. Hiroshima contained the 
headquarters of the Second General Army and Fifth Division. Nagasaki had wide-ranging industrial 
activity that provided the production of military equipment and warships. The use of nuclear weapons 
is argued to have had concrete and direct military advantage which stopped the war early. Philippine 
Justice Delfin Jaranilla, member of the Tokyo tribunal, wrote: 
‘If a means is justified by an end, the use of the atomic bomb was justified for it brought 
Japan to her knees and ended the horrible war. If the war had gone longer, without the use of 
the atomic bomb, how many thousands and thousands of helpless men, women and children 
would have needlessly died and suffered?
24’ 
This shows how the principle of proportionality is still ambiguous even though it is international 
customary law. This concept will further be explored later in regards to the use of white phosphorus. 
There are two sides to the argument. One side highlights the enormity of casualties that occur as a 
result of one weapon whereas the other believes that ending a war early will ensure that less people 
die as a whole. It will be considered to see if the use of white phosphorus could shorten a conflict and 
therefore limit the overall loss of civilian life and injury to civilians. The effects of white phosphorus 
are on a much smaller scale compared to the use of nuclear weapons but the concept of 
                                                          
21 J Samuel Walker, Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground [2005] Diplomatic 
History, 334 
22 Potsdam Declaration, Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender [1945] Birth of the Constitution of Japan, 
accessed 5th October 2016  <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html> 
23 Winston Churchill, 'Why Should We Fear for our Future?' House of Commons Debate [1945] 70-133 
24 John W Dower, ‘Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War I’[1st edn, W W Norton  & Company, 1999] 473 
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proportionality still applies. This principle will play a major role in the thesis and is one of the 
principles that will be argued that white phosphorus violates. 
Another principle that can be found in IHL is the prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering. This prohibition has remained a key element of IHL and the principle can be dated back to 
the 1863 Lieber Code, where it was said that: 
‘Military necessity does not admit of cruelty – that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake 
of suffering.
25’ 
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration states: 
‘That the progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the 
calamities of war and the only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.
26’ 
The 1899 Hague Convention that adopted the Hague Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets 
shows how this particular prohibition has been applied in IHL. It stated: 
‘The  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  abstain  from  the  use  of  bullets  which expand or flatten 
easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the 
core or is pierced with incisions.
27’ 
The Hague Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets was a response to a rifle bullet that was 
adopted by British troops. The bullets were used in armed conflict against the Indian Empire. The 
specific bullet used was called the ‘dum-dum’ bullet which was named after the town near Calcutta in 
which the bullets were manufactured. Dum-dum bullets were designed to expand on impact. This 
would generate a much larger wound to the body of a person. Whilst the British army deemed the 
bullets effective in fighting against the ‘active and brave barbarian foes,28’ the ICRC was in agreement 
that the bullets caused unnecessary suffering.
29
  
This led to the Hague Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets being adopted. Its significance is 
important, as it shows how the principles of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury have 
directly prohibited a munition. Rule 70 drafted by the ICRC states that incendiary weapons are one of 
the types of weapon that have been cited in practice to cause unnecessary suffering if used in certain 
or all contexts.
30
 As Protocol III of the CCW deals with incendiary weapons, this thesis will consider 
the principles of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury throughout to see if these principles are 
violated. Even though dum-dum bullets were created with the intention of causing of harm and white 
phosphorus is not, it does not mean that the principle cannot be applied to white phosphorus as well. 
The principle is considered as customary international law and is applicable to both international and 
non-international armed conflicts. However there are differing views on the interpretation of what is 
considered as superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. If a weapon causes suffering that has no 
military purpose, then it is deemed to violate the rule. However, many states interpret military purpose 
differently. For example, it could be argued that a munition that does not have a sufficient available 
alternative should be considered differently. If there is no other available weapon, then the suffering 
does not become unnecessary; it becomes the only available possibility and therefore a military 
                                                          
25 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), [1863] Art 16 
26 Saint Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of certain Explosive Projectiles [1868] 
27The Hague Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets [1899] Declaration (IV) 
28Alan Ogston, 'Continental criticism of English rifle bullets' [1st edn, British Medical Journal, 1899] 752-757 
29 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, Rule 77 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule77> accessed 6th October 2016 
30 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, Rule 70 <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule70> accessed 6th October 2016 
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necessity. There would need to be a balance between military necessity and the superfluous injury that 
could be caused. Kalshoven and Zegveld agree and say that the principle is too abstract as there is no 
clear distinction of what constitutes unnecessary suffering.
31
 As a result, this principle will be 
considered and observed in the following chapters and it will be determined that using white 
phosphorus causes superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. 
Currently, the law of military necessity cannot override any aspect of IHL unless it is expressly stated 
that it may do so.
32
 When any treaty, convention or law of IHL is drafted, it is done so taking into 
account military necessity. An illustration of such a statement can be seen by Article 23(g) of the 
Hague Regulations. It states that it is prohibited to: 
'Destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war.
33
' 
The principle of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering needs to be considered as it plays a 
major role in IHL. The 1907 Hague Convention is an international treaty and declaration that was 
negotiated at international peace conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands. The Hague 
Conventions was one of the first formal statements of the laws of war in regards to international law 
and helps show the development of the principle. The Hague Regulations state: 
‘It is especially prohibited to employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury.’ And that ‘the rights of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy, 
is not unlimited.
34’  
Article 23(e) of the same Regulation adds that it is prohibited for: 
‘Arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.35’  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has too commented on the cardinal principles that constitute 
the fabric of humanitarian law.
36
 Regarding unnecessary suffering, the ICJ has added that states ‘do 
not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.
37’ The ICJ states that this 
fundamental rule must be observed by all states regardless of if they have ratified the conventions that 
directly contain the principles. Judge Higgins’ dissenting opinion from the case concerning Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons also reiterated that a weapon that causes unnecessary 
suffering or rendered death inevitable would not be permitted. She added ‘a military target may not be 
attacked if collateral civilian casualties would be excessive in relation to the military advantage.
38’ 
This all further reinforces the strength of the principle as it can constantly be found within IHL. 
Article 3 of the 1993 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Statute also 
states that the International Tribunal has the power to prosecute those that employ weapons which 
cause unnecessary suffering.
39
 With there being potential repercussions, any violation of the principle 
needs to be recognised. These principles are an important part of IHL, and the values all need to be 
                                                          
31Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian 
Law [4th edn, CUP, 2011] 
32 Jasmine Moussa, Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the two bodies of law [2008] 
33 The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land [1907] Art 23(g) 
34 The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land [1899] Art 22 
35The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land [1899] Art 23(e) 
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upheld together. Unnecessary suffering to enemy combatants can weaken enemy forces and it is 
understood that war will have calamites, but this does not mean that a war can be won by any means 
possible. 
1.4. THE CCW AND THE CWC 
The general law of IHL that is relevant has been briefly discussed. By introducing it, a larger review 
of how the law operates is shown. This is vital, as it demonstrates that there are limits in 
contemporary warfare and states are not unlimited in what they are able to do. Doing so enables us to 
look at more specific treaties and conventions and there will now be focus briefly on the CCW and the 
CWC. These two conventions will play a major role in the upcoming chapters and will be introduced 
now and analysed in the relevant chapters later.  
In December 1983 the CCW entered into force. It aims to protect civilians from weapons that can 
cause injury and also to protect combatants from suffering unnecessarily from weapons. The 
convention deals with both international and non-international armed conflicts. Originally it was 
annexed with three protocols with two additional protocols later added. The convention itself contains 
only general provisions and it does not specifically prohibit weapons.  Protocol III of the CCW 
contains just two articles with the first solely being definitions. An incendiary weapon is defined as: 
'Any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn 
injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a 
chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.
40
' 
It also defines what is not to be classed as an incendiary weapon by stating: 
'Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke 
or signalling systems are not to be regarded as incendiary weapons.
41’ 
The noteworthy part of the Protocol is what is not to be regarded under the convention as an 
incendiary weapon. A munition such as a tracer is a bullet that has a pyrotechnic charge that burns 
extremely brightly. This makes the projectile trajectory of the bullet visible to the naked eye during 
the day or night. The benefit of this is that it enables the shooter of the tracer to make aiming 
corrections by monitoring the trajectory of the weapon. Though it offers these qualities, the tracer 
could then hit a target and through a chemical reaction could burn a person or cause a fire. This effect 
however under the CCW is regarded as an ‘incidental incendiary effect.’ The effect of the chemical 
reaction is only a consequence of the primary objective of the munition. Only a weapon that is 
primarily used to cause injury or set fire to objects is to be prohibited. This is controversial, as a 
weapon could cause devastating effects but not fit within the CCW’s regulation.    
Protocol III is therefore inadequate in preventing humanitarian harm with weapons that have 
incendiary effects. A munition such as white phosphorus that can cause incidental incendiary effects 
is able to escape the regulation of Protocol III. Even though the munition may cause severe pain as it 
burns the flesh of a victim, the nature of impact by the weapon is not taken into account This will 
further be explored in the chapters to come, as it will be argued that the current definition of Protocol 
III is too narrow, as it allows for multi-purpose munitions such as white phosphorus to escape 
regulation. 
Even though this thesis will conclude by showing the need for Protocol III to be amended, other areas 
of IHL need to be discussed. Discussion of white phosphorus is not limited to that of Protocol III of 
the CCW. For example white phosphorus could be regarded as a chemical weapon and fall within the 
                                                          
40 Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
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scope of the CWC. If this was to happen then the use of white phosphorus would be prohibited under 
the CWC. The CWC contains 24 articles and 3 annexes, and its aim is to completely eliminate the 
development, acquisition, retention, production, stockpiling, transfer or use of chemical weapons.
42
   
The CWC is promoted and verified by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW). The organisation ensures that the prohibition of chemical weapons is upheld and also 
ensures that any chemical weapons are destroyed. As of October 2015, approximately 90% of the 
world's declared stockpile of chemical weapons had been destroyed.
43
 States party to the convention 
have also agreed to an inspection procedure by the OPCW at any given time without refusal. Similar 
to the CCW, the CWC has an article that defines what falls within the scope of the convention. A 
chemical weapon is defined as a: 
‘(a) Toxic chemical and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited 
under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; 
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the 
toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a). 
44’ 
A toxic chemical is further defined to mean: 
‘Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.
45’ 
Different interpretations of the CWC understand the convention in different ways.  There is ambiguity 
in what fits within the scope of the convention. A chemical weapon needs to be specifically designed 
to cause death meaning it needs to be manufactured with the purpose of causing death. And the death 
caused needs to be a consequence of the toxic properties of toxic chemicals. Only then will a chemical 
fall within the scope of the CWC. 
It is difficult to gauge what a weapon is specifically designed to be used for. For example, even 
though white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon, it would be difficult to say what the purpose of 
the weapon is when being designed. It could be for illumination or its incendiary qualities. The 
munition has the capability to effectively deliver both jobs, but there will never be a clear definite 
reason for its design. As the thesis will argue that it should be the CCW that is amended to take an 
effects based approach, it is important to express why having a design based approach for the CWC is 
beneficial. Doing this will counter the argument that the CWC should also cover white phosphorus.  
Equally, when a toxic chemical is defined, it is not said what constitutes ‘temporary incapacitation.’ 
Temporary could range from just a couple seconds to a few hours with there being no clear 
distinction. For this reason, it will be observed to see what constitutes incapacitation and whether 
white phosphorus would fall within this definition and what is required for substances to fit in the 
category. Determining whether dual use chemicals are chemical weapons is not straightforward. 
Chemicals such as chlorine, phosgene and hydrogen cyanide were all used during the First World War 
as chemical weapons. However, they are also key ingredients in numerous commercial products. 
Because of the chemicals various uses, even though it could be used as a weapon, a complete ban 
would not be possible. There are legal uses of the chemicals. A balance needs to be made, and this 
balance will be considered to see if white phosphorus should be considered as a chemical weapon. It 
will also be discussed to see if the CWC should be amended to fit white phosphorus within its scope.  
                                                          
42Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Art I 
43 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, accessed 7th October 2016 <https://www.opcw.org/> 
44Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Art II (1a) 
45 ibid, Art II (2) 
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Additionally, the definition of toxicity will further be explored and the different ways to measure 
effects will be assessed. When exploring the CWC and its potential relevance to white phosphorus, it 
will conclude that the CWC should not be amended to fit white phosphorus within its scope. After 
looking at how white phosphorus does not currently fit within its definition of a chemical weapon, 
there will be a conclusion that any changes to the CWC would be detrimental to the convention as a 
whole. 
1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
To summarise before the next chapter, the key legal problems will be reiterated. This thesis will 
conclude with the notion that Protocol III of the CCW should be amended to take an effects based 
approach rather than a design based approach. 
With this exploitation, the principles and values of IHL are undermined. The principle of 
proportionality prohibits an attack that causes incidental loss of life that is excessive in relation to the 
direct military advantage anticipated. In accordance with this principle, it will be argued that using 
white phosphorus undermines this and it will be shown how it does so.   
As the legal framework of the study has been set, and the context of the thesis introduced, the means 
to reaching the conclusion can begin. The format for the rest of the thesis will be set out in dividing 
chapters. There will be five more chapters and they will be under the following headings:  
Chapter 2 - Use of white phosphorus 
Chapter 3 - Zyklon B 
Chapter 4 - The Chemical Weapons Convention 
Chapter 5 - The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
The second chapter will look at the effects of white phosphorus in armed conflicts and these effects 
will be considered against the principles of IHL. These arguments together will show why there is 
need for change in IHL when dealing with the use of white phosphorus. It will show that an 
amendment needs to be made to strengthen the law surrounding white phosphorus.  
Chapter 3 will be the first look in to how to strengthen the law of white phosphorus and offer better 
protection. Potentially expanding liability for violating the law will be considered. The Zyklon B case 
will also play a role to help determine whether liability concerning white phosphorus needs to be 
expanded. By expanding liability, not only will the users of white phosphorus that exploit the law face 
prosecution, but also those who aided them. 
The CWC in Chapter 4 will also be assessed to see if there can be a change to the convention that will 
strengthen the law for white phosphorus. It will conclude by stating that any amendment to the CWC 
would be detrimental to the convention.  It will also dismiss the notion that white phosphorus should 
be regarded as a chemical weapon under its current state. Further exploration will be done to the 
scope of the CWC with how a toxic chemical is defined and how it would be possible to measure 
effects if the CWC was to be amended to take an effects based approach. 
Chapter 5 will be the chapter where it is confirmed that Protocol III of the CCW should be amended 
to take an effects based approach. By this stage, other possibilities will have been considered and 
dismissed. The specific amendments that would need to be made to have an effects based approach 
will also be set out. There will also be consideration to see if there are benefits to not amending 
Protocol III at all. 
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Chapter 6 will conclude the thesis. It will act as an overview for the entire thesis and it will consider 
any follow up questions that arise as a result of the conclusion. 
As noted, the following chapter will primarily deal with the white phosphorus munition itself and 
cases of its use in modern warfare. This is vital as it is then possible to see the justifications given by 
states for using white phosphorus. By combining the justifications with the effects of the weapon, it 
sets up a discussion in the further chapters to see whether the justifications and effects are balanced. 
The case studies for this chapter will be Fallujah, Gaza and Bosnia. They have been chosen because 
each case study presents a different argument as to why there is an issue with using white phosphorus 
in armed conflicts and how the current law fails to deal with the issues. The use of white phosphorus 
in Fallujah particularly shows the justifications given by states when they use the munition. Gaza has 
been chosen to highlight the stigma surrounding the weapon and how stigma affects conflicts that 
involve white phosphorus. Bosnia will be able to highlight the growing change in perception to white 
phosphorus as the use of white phosphorus during this conflict was not commented on as much as the 
other two examples. 
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2. THE USE OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS 
2.1. USE OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS IN IRAQ 
For a detailed explanation on what white phosphorus is, how it works and its history refer to 
Appendix A. The first case study that will be looked at here is the United States’ use of white 
phosphorus in Fallujah, Iraq. This particular study is to show justifications given by the United States 
when using the munition.  
Operation Al-Fajr, Phantom Fury and the Second Battle of Fallujah are all names associated with the 
armed conflict that occurred in Fallujah during the Iraq war. The Unites States military described the 
conflict as 'some of the heaviest urban combat since the Battle of Hue City
46
' and it involved 
American, British and Iraqi military forces.  
The United States fought and conducted an operation so that they could take control of Fallujah. This 
was because of a previous operation in the city that took place that will be referred to as the first battle 
of Fallujah. On the 4
th
 April 2004, the first battle of Fallujah had begun and the intervention lasted 
nearly four weeks. It reported to have led to around 211-255 combatants being killed
47
 with 572–616 
civilians also being killed
48
. The United States consequently withdrew from Fallujah on May 1
st
 2004. 
The first battle of Fallujah resulted in four United States contractors being burned, beheaded and hung 
from a bridge. This was a catalyst that prompted control of the city to begin once again, and a second 
battle was later to later commence. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt after the death of the contractors 
stated there would be an ‘overwhelming’ response and said ‘we will pacify that city49.’ 
The second battle of Fallujah began on November 7
th
 2004 and ended on 23
rd
 December 2004. The 
second battle of Fallujah has given rise to an intense debate over the legality of the use of white 
phosphorus on the modern battlefield
50
 and will be the battle that will be primarily focused on due to 
its relevance to white phosphorus. 
Prior to the second battle of Fallujah, the majority of the civilian population had evacuated the city. It 
has been estimated that 70-90% of the civilian population fled prior to the attack.
51
 Notably, this 
means that the number of potential civilian casualties would have lowered. The operation began with 
an attempt to capture the Fallujah General Hospital. This was intended as a diversion, so that the 
primary operation could commence to overtake the insurgents holding the city.  
The United States have confirmed they used white phosphorus during the second battle of Fallujah. 
The United States explicitly stated however that they did not use the weapon against civilians. Under 
IHL, a civilian is regarded as a person who is not a member of the armed forces and the civilian 
population comprises all persons who are civilians
52
. A civilian may not be directly targeted, and 
therefore the use of white phosphorus against civilians would be illegal. The United States stated that 
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they only used the weapon against enemy combatants and only used it so that they could produce 
smoke and illuminate the battlefield.
53
 Regardless, their use of white phosphors is controversial.   
It is estimated that the number of insurgent casualties range between 1,200 and 1,500 with an 
additional 1,500 insurgents captured.
54
 The ICRC has estimated that there were around 800 civilian 
deaths as a result of the battle.
55
 Even though there is no figure to say how many deaths white 
phosphorus contributed to, it helps create a picture of the consequences of the battle. Prior to the 
civilians fleeing Fallujah, there were around 300,000 civilians that resided in the city. Using the 
estimated 70-90% fleeing, around 210,000-270,000 people left the city prior to the attack with 
30,000-90,000 staying behind. Just around 0.3%-3% of the civilians who remained died. This appears 
to be a relatively low number and the concept of proportionality introduced in Chapter 1 can be 
applied here. The relatively low number of civilian deaths from the second battle of Fallujah could be 
because white phosphorus was used. The munition could have been used legally and prevented the 
armed conflict going on for a longer period of time and prevented more civilians dying.  
White phosphorus was reportedly used in a tactic known as ‘shake and bake’ by the United States 
during the battle. This tactic uses the incendiary and smoke properties of white phosphorus. Its 
purpose is to remove enemy combatants from their location to a more desirable location so that they 
then can be either killed or captured. The entrenched positions from which the combatants are from 
make it easier for the attackers and white phosphorus is only being used as an irritant. When the 
United States used white phosphorus they stated: 
‘White phosphorus proved to be an effective and versatile munition. We used it for screening 
missions at two breeches and later in the fight, as a potent psychological weapon against the 
insurgents in trench lines and spider holes where we could not get effects on them with high 
explosives. We fired 'shake and bake' missions at the insurgents, using white phosphorus to 
flush them out and high explosives to take them out.’56 
This tactic is not without controversy, and it is shown by the United States needing to justify their use 
of white phosphorus.  General Peter Pace argued that white phosphorus: 
'Is not a chemical weapon, it is an incendiary. And it is well within the law of war to use those 
weapons as they're being used, for marking and for screening.
57
 
Even though the argument of proportionality is there to be used, when it was used white phosphorus 
was described as ‘a shower of fire.’58 A documentary was produced titled Fallujah: The Hidden 
Massacre.
59
 The documentary film was produced by Sigfrido Ranucci and Maurizio Torrealta who are 
Italian journalists. It was aired for the first time on Italy's RAI state television network and there are 
interviews with United States soldiers, Iraqi doctors and international journalists. The journalists 
themselves however do not hold much validity. Another documentary produced by the two did not 
hold any technical explanation and was not regarded to have had any legitimate claims.
60
 Likewise, 
Fallujah: The Hidden Massacre even though gained attention, was faced with criticism. 
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Many of the arguments presented by the documentary were on the basis that white phosphorus is a 
chemical weapon and banned under the CWC. The debate on whether white phosphorus should be 
classed as a chemical weapon will come in later chapters, but the documentary itself shows the 
growing attention to white phosphorus when used in armed conflict. It had put in context the effects 
that white phosphorus can cause, and showed them to viewers.  It brought even more widespread 
attention to the United States and its use of white phosphorus in Fallujah. The stigma of white 
phosphorus was growing and it was becoming a topic that was being discussed more and more. It may 
have prevented more people from dying in the second battle of Fallujah, but this did not prevent the 
stigma of the munition increasing.    
2.2. USE OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS IN GAZA  
With growing attention, naturally there is an increase in stigma and this usually leads to pressure for 
laws to change. The increase in stigma has not halted, and the involvement of white phosphorus in the 
war in Gaza shows how such stigma can affect proceedings. By showing the levels of stigma 
surrounding the weapon, it will prove that even if in some scenarios using white phosphorus may 
help, as a whole it is an unfavourable munition that needs to be controlled in a better way. This would 
dismiss the argument in support of the munition being able to help wars as in many cases it can have a 
central role with devastating effects.  
The Gaza war, also known as 'Operation Cast Lead' and 'Battle of al-Furqan' began on the 27
th
 
December 2008 and ended on the 18
th
 January 2009. The war was between Hamas and Israel and it 
was located in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic organisation that has been the 
governing authority of the Gaza Strip. Israel fought to prevent indiscriminate Palestinian rocket fire 
into Israel and to stop weapons being smuggled into the Gaza strip
61
. During this armed conflict, it 
was reported that white phosphorus had been used. 
By 12
th
 January 2009, it had been reported that more than 50 victims in Nasser Hospital suffered from 
white phosphorus burns and that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
headquarters had also been hit with white phosphorus. The headquarters was consequently set afire. 
The number of human casualties during the war varies and there is no clear information that states 
how much white phosphorus contributed. Nonetheless, based on extensive field research by non-
governmental organisations the number of people killed ranges between 1,387 and 1,417.
62
 Gaza 
authorities themselves report the number being 1,444 fatalities
63
 whilst the Israeli Government reports 
a figure of 1,166.
64
 
During the Gaza war, the United Nations Human Rights Council bought together a team to work as an 
independent international fact finding investigation. Its goal was to establish if any violations under 
IHL and international human rights law had taken place.  The mission was referred to as the United 
Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict and is more commonly known as the Goldstone 
Report. The Goldstone Report is a 74-page report led by Richard Goldstone, a South African jurist. It 
was released on the 15
th
 September 2009 and concluded with stating that the Israel Defence Forces 
(IDF) and Palestinian militant groups had committed war crimes. It added that they possibly also 
committed crimes against humanity. The purpose of the reports was to: 
‘Dispatch an urgent independent international fact-finding mission to investigate all violations 
of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the occupying power 
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Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression.
65’ 
The government of Israel rejected the report stating that it was full of errors and that they did not 
deliberately target civilians. Militant Islamic group Hamas also rejected aspects of the report.
66
 It must 
be noted however, that the findings are not to a standard of a judicial investigation and there was not a 
criminal standard of proof met. Goldstone stated that the case was a prima facie case that was 
'reasonable on weighing the evidence.'
67
 The evidence collected would not be admissible in a criminal 
court. For this reason, the inclusion of the Goldstone Report and the Gaza war is not to only show the 
effects of using white phosphorus, but highlight the stigma that comes with the munition.  
The Goldstone Report claims that during the Gaza war, Israeli armed forces were systematically 
reckless in determining to use white phosphorus in built up areas. The report highlighted Israel’s use 
of white phosphorus and scrutinised it increasing the negative perception of the munition. Originally, 
Israel held the stance that ‘certainty white phosphorus was absolutely not being used.’68 They first 
dismissed the use of white phosphorus, before changing their stance to only using white phosphorus 
for its obscurant qualities. This sudden change highlights how the stigma surrounding the weapon has 
an impact on states. As shown, currently under IHL white phosphorus is legally able to be used for its 
obscurant qualities. So if Israel had used the weapon in this way, there would be no reason to hide the 
fact that they used the munition. Nonetheless, initially Israel wanted to be distanced from the munition 
and not be associated with it. As armed conflicts around the world occur, the perception of white 
phosphorus also changes. The United States reiterated that their use of white phosphorus was legal, 
and held this view compared to Israel initially dismissing the use of white phosphorus all together 
before then confirming they had used the munition. 
In July 2009, the Israeli government stated that the primary rationale for firing white phosphorus was 
to produce a smokescreen.
69
 Though this remained their official stance, it still does not appear to be 
likely. It is strongly suggested that the IDF were using white phosphorus for its incendiary effects. 
White phosphorus does offer extra qualities that other smoke projectiles do not possess, however 
these qualities would prove to be ineffective. There were some attacks that had no Israeli forces on the 
ground making the obscurant qualities ineffective.
 70
 The obscurant qualities would not have been 
needed when white phosphorus was being used. This strongly suggests that white phosphorus was 
used for a different reason. Once again, the current law is shown to be potentially exploited. Having 
law that focuses on the reason why a munition is being used rather than its effects allows for states to 
find loopholes and use them for their own gain. 
There were reports that white phosphorus was fired in densely populated areas, and this regardless 
would be a breach of IHL by being an indiscriminate attack.
71
 Under pressure and in a crowded 
environment would make it so it was impossible to not make mistakes and not cause civilian harm. 
Even specialists who are expertly trained and are aware of what sort of damage the munition can do, 
would not be able to constantly avoid areas they were not trying to hit. If this was the case, then 
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regardless of if Protocol III is amended, this attack would be regarded as illegal. White phosphorus 
did not have any benefit when the IDF decided to use the munition. If smoke-screening was the 
objective, then there were other equal alternatives. The argument for white phosphorus being the best 
munition cannot be used. White phosphorus offers the benefit of being able to interfere with infra-red 
spectrum which results in impeding the use of night vision and infra-red tracking systems. The white 
phosphorus used by the IDF was during the day and obviated the need to use white phosphorus. An 
alternative 155mm smoke projectile would have offered the same qualities as white phosphorus if the 
obscurant qualities were the only reason in which it was used. Doing this would have provided no risk 
of fires, or burns and injury to civilians. This also leads to the argument of military necessity not 
holding ground either. White phosphorus was not the only possible weapon that could be used. There 
were other munitions that could have been used that would not have such effects.  
To put these effects of white phosphorus in Gaza into perspective, a study
72
  that observed the Gaza 
war can be explored. The study used statistics from Gaza and showed the sort of damage that could 
occur if the same attack was made in other areas of the world. The Jabalia Camp in Gaza has a 
population of 93,455
73
, an area of 1.4 square miles and a density of 66,754 per square mile. The 
Jabalia Camp was targeted and in total 80 housing units, 2 schools, 2 retail stores and 1 pharmacy 
were affected. If the same attack was made in the Tel Aviv City centre, 500 housing units, 30 local 
businesses, 2 museums and 1 school would be affected. In New York City, it would be 950 housing 
units, 40 local businesses, 1 University and 1 Church. In Paris, 400 housing units, 15 local businesses, 
2 hotels and 1 Post Office would be affected. The same study with the use of a computer assisted 
simulation ran 150 iterations over a 30,000 square metre area of Jabalia.
74
 It showed what sort of 
trajectory the munition would take and the kind of damage it could ensue. Out of the 150 simulations, 
149 of them resulted in over 60 individual wedges hitting roofs. In 139, more than 20 hit a façade and 
in 147 more than 15 hit the ground. These high ranging probabilities, (99%, 93% and 98% 
respectively) show the intense difficulty with trying to control the white phosphorus wedges to limit 
the damage it can cause.
75
  
There is a lot of stigma surrounding white phosphorus. It does not appear to follow the values of IHL. 
A weapon that can cause the same effects of white phosphorus is prohibited if it is originally designed 
to cause incendiary effects. The values of IHL want to offer humanitarian protection and the best 
possible way to do so is to focus on the effects of white phosphorus. Its effects can be too devastating 
and the justification given by the United States for using it in Fallujah should not be prioritised. The 
role of white phosphorus in Gaza shows that the nature of the munition is one that causes too much 
suffering to those affected, and the growing stigma surrounding the weapon shows support for this. 
2.3. USE OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS IN BOSNIA 
The final case that will be looked at is the Bosnia war. It is notably an armed conflict that occurred 
before the second battle of Fallujah and the Gaza War. It has been chosen in this order to highlight the 
growing change in perception to white phosphorus as there is greatly increasing stigma to the weapon.  
Whereas both Fallujah and Gaza were widely reported conflicts and brought on many debates as to 
the legality of the use of white phosphorus, in contrast the Bosnian war did not. The Bosnian War 
occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is believed to have started on the 6
th
 April 1992, ending on 
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the 14
th
 December 1995. The war has been described as the 'most devastating conflict in Europe since 
the end of World War II
76
' and came as a result of the breakup of the Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The Siege of Sarajevo started in early April 1992, and it began the longest siege in modern warfare of 
a capital city. A total of 1,425 days bought terror against the residents of Sarajevo, as the siege sought 
to force Bosnian authorities to meet the demands of the Serbs. On the 8
th
 February 1994, a telegram 
was sent to the White House from the United States Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith. He stated 
that Sarajevo was being subject to 'constant and indiscriminate shelling and gunfire.'
77
 As a result of 
the war, Muhamed Sacirbey the Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations, called for the assistance 
of the United Nations Security Council for the use of white phosphorus to be banned under the 
Geneva conventions following its use against the population of Sarajevo. He stated: 
‘These weapons are being used against the population of Sarajevo without punishment or 
response. According to United Nations logic, which justifies the failure to act by the fact that 
the sides are equal in strength, the Nazi murders of innocent civilians were really nobody's 
business, because the allies more than matched the Nazis in strength.
78
' 
There is little literature on the use of white phosphorus in Bosnia. The reasons for this and possible 
causes are because the use of white phosphorus in the war itself did not produce controversy.  It has 
been shown that Serbian  forces  shelled  a village,  and  a  white  phosphorus  shell hit  a  house,  
burning  one of its  occupants. This was confirmed to have happened by the United Nations with a 
thick white smoke from white phosphorus grenades being deployed
79
. Intended to intimidate civilians, 
a dozen shells were shot across the city of Sarajevo killing at least 5 people and injuring more than 20. 
Even though white phosphorus was used during the Bosnian war, compared to the commentaries of 
Fallujah and Gaza, there has been little research into Bosnia. There has been no similar fact finding 
mission or documentary. Comparing this to now, in which there are many comments of white 
phosphorus, a growth with the stigma of white phosphorus can be seen. The Bosnian Ambassador 
highlighted this issue, and was not happy with the lack of support. Whereas in the Bosnia war, the use 
of white phosphorus was able to slightly go under the radar, now when states use this munition this 
would not happen. Following this growing awareness of white phosphorus, the best time to amend the 
law would be now, a time where the stigma surrounding the weapon is high, and support for 
amendment would be available. It is not a case of the munition being more widely used now; it is just 
being reported more frequently. The law has remained the same, so it has not strengthened. It is 
ultimately a clear example of the stigma surrounding the weapon increasing. The weapons use goes 
against the values of IHL, and there needs to be change. Such change is yet to take place, and it 
should be accomplished now before the problem becomes more of an issue.  
2.4. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There has been a chronological development of the current knowledge and with the literature giving a 
critical review of the gaps in knowledge and potential problems, it is useful to observe.  It will be 
commented on to show how other academics have reached their conclusions and the arguments that 
they have presented. Doing this will assist in reaching the conclusion that Protocol III of the CCW 
should take an effects based approach. The literature review aims to highlight where the thesis will fit 
within the current knowledge.  The objective of reviewing the literature is to identify an area where 
further discussion can be made and why it would be useful to do so. 
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Currently white phosphorus is able to be used in armed conflict and produce incendiary effects. 
However, Protocol III of the CCW only prohibits munitions that are ‘primarily designed to set fire or 
cause burn injury.’ This means that a weapon such as white phosphorus that has various capabilities 
escapes the regulation of Protocol III as it would not be primarily designed to be used in this way. Its 
incendiary effects can be classed as a secondary effect. It is a munition that can illuminate, signal, 
screen and also be used for its incendiary effects on top of being able to also ricochet, penetrate, and 
ignite. Consequently there has been a great deal of research in this area of law and Bradley Samuels 
claims the use of white phosphorus is ‘highly controversial80’ especially in highly populated areas. 
Something being controversial does not provide enough information on its own, but it is a useful point 
to observe first in regards to this literature review. There will always be different arguments presented 
and these arguments will be illustrated.  
Controversy can be from a culmination of stigma and in regards to white phosphorus, as the weapon 
is more frequently used, the fact that it can escape regulation means that there are more commentaries 
on the topic. IHL aims to minimise the sufferings of war as much as possible and white phosphorus is 
a weapon that cannot be controlled once deployed. As a result, academics, non-governmental 
organisations and states continue to comment on these issues. For example, Samuels when focusing 
on the effects of the munition states white phosphorus puts civilians, objects and the environment at 
great risk.
81
 This risk is equal to an incendiary weapon, and yet an incendiary weapon is prohibited. It 
is understood that war will have calamities, but a weapon that excessively causes calamities is 
contentious.  
Where there is controversy, there will always be ideas presented to combat the issues. As white 
phosphorus has incendiary capabilities, a link between white phosphorus and Protocol III of the CCW 
can be found in the discussions. Protocol III states 'any weapon or munition which is primarily 
designed to set fire or cause burn injury'
82
 is to be prohibited. As white phosphorus does not fit within 
the current definition of an incendiary weapon, those who believe the use of white phosphorus is 
controversial look at this definition and see it as inadequate.  There is no real primary purpose to 
white phosphorus. When it is being manufactured, it could be used for illumination or as an 
incendiary. It is up to the user of the munition to decide what they want to use the weapon for and 
because of this, the munition can never be primarily designed to set fire or cause burn injury.
83
 
MacLeod and Rogers argue that white phosphorus can never the fit the definition and a lot of the 
literature discusses this. For example because of the weapons effects, Reyhani believes white 
phosphorus should fall under the scope of an incendiary weapon and therefore be prohibited.
84
 
Customarily, it appears as if researchers see white phosphorus as a growing concern as it continues to 
be used but escapes regulation and is not prohibited like incendiary weapons. Hashey comments on 
the ambiguity in the legal status of white phosphorus in IHL. He asserts that the status of Protocol III 
in regards to munitions such as white phosphorus has now become 'untenable
85
.' As white phosphorus 
in continued to be used and is able to escape the regulation of Protocol III, the literature strengthens in 
this area. Hashey expands on his earlier point and considers that the use of white phosphorus in 
warfare may already be illegal.  
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There is space in the literature to offer ideas in how white phosphorus could fit within the scope of 
Protocol III of the CCW and this is what this thesis will attempt to do. The literature shows that there 
is an issue and that it is regarded as controversial. With new ideas put forward, academics can help 
present a suitable resolution to the issues. 
However, even though there are studies about the growing concern of white phosphorus, there are also 
other areas of the literature that do not follow the notion that white phosphorus is controversial and 
that there needs to be change.  To fully agree with the above studies, it is important to examine the 
other side of the literature. This side of the literature is important to observe as it shows that they are 
not being ignored and that any conclusion does consider their arguments. Gross in Moral Dilemmas of 
Modern War highlights the effectiveness of using white phosphorus in 'shake and bake' missions
86
. He 
comments on how effective the munition is, and says it is perfectly legal and a legitimate tool of 
military forces in armed conflicts. As already noted, it is expected for there to be casualties in war and 
there is literature that supports the notion that this should not be regulated too much. If munitions are 
constricted too much, then the expectations of war become unrealistic. Some of the current literature 
supports the use of white phosphorus and does not see it as controversial. 
There is therefore not a clear condemnation on the use of white phosphorus. Adelman seeks for 
people to look objectively at the context of war.
87
 For example, Evans argues that white phosphorus is 
the simplest way of effectively masking troops from the enemy and is no different or 'more dangerous 
or cruel than any other weapon.'
88
 There is a focus on the capabilities of the weapon in regards to its 
benefits in armed conflict. White phosphorus can be an extremely useful weapon to armed forces and 
there will be support for a munition that can deliver desired results. As a result of this, there is not 
always a backing for the condemnation of white phosphorus. As the use of white phosphorus 
increases and the commentaries on the controversy of it does as well, so does the support for white 
phosphorus and this can be seen by the literature in areas such as this. 
The discussion of white phosphorus does not just concern incendiary weapons. As it is a dual-use 
chemical, it could be considered to be a chemical weapon. The CWC prohibits chemical weapons and 
if white phosphorus was to fit within the scope of the convention, it would be completely prohibited. 
Castaing believes that white phosphorus should be seen as a chemical weapon.
89
 He holds the view 
that the definition of a chemical weapon under the CCW is lax and therefore white phosphorus does 
actually fall in its scope. This is a result on the literature surrounding white phosphorus growing. 
Castaing is not the first to consider white phosphorus as a chemical weapon, but he considers in his 
research that because white phosphorus is unnatural and not found in nature – it should be classed as a 
chemical weapon. As there is literature concerning white phosphorus and its classification as a 
chemical weapon, it is important to examine this view. This thesis as a result will look at white 
phosphorus and its classification as a chemical weapon to dismiss this area of the literature.  
The literature on human rights treaties and whether their ratification makes a difference offers an 
interesting backdrop. Oona Hathaway in ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ explores 
the effects that ratification to human rights treaties has in regards to human rights violations. She 
argues that human rights practices in states worsen with ratification of treaties because the ratifying 
state is rewarded with reduced political pressure to promote human rights standards. 
90
 Applying this 
to IHL, if the law surrounding white phosphorus was to be strengthened, then it could potentially 
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mean that the humanitarian protection could worsen. If this was the case, then further amendments 
would not be the best cause of action and it could not be recommended for Protocol III of the CCW to 
take an effects based approach. However, this led to a follow up study by Ryan Goodman and Derek 
Jinks. They stated that Hathaway had not adequately covered all possible angles in her study.
91
  Their 
argument could be applied to those who believe that amending Protocol III could have a detrimental 
effect. They state: 
‘In many jurisdictions, treaty ratification makes possible the initiation of individual legal 
claims based on the treaty's substantive guarantees. As a consequence, it encourages lawyers 
and their clients to express injuries in terms of the newly established treaty obligations.
92’ 
In a domestic example, as they explain, if there are more expansive sexual violence laws, statistically 
there is more likelihood it will result in a higher number of rape claims. This is regardless of if the 
actual rate of rape has changed.
93
  This is not because more rapes have occurred, but because there is 
greater scope to claim with more also becoming aware of the issue. 
If a similar model is used for white phosphorus, as IHL progresses and more treaties, conventions and 
principles are created and expanded on – there is a greater likelihood that states are to raise concern 
about the use of the munition. In the chapters to come, this will be assessed to see if there is a need for 
amendment to Protocol III of the CCW but this will not be done under the notion that doing so will 
offer worse humanitarian protection than before. It will instead, consider other possible issues such as 
the possibility that not using white phosphorus in armed conflict has become emerging customary law 
meaning there is no need for an amendment. Enforcement in regards to IHL is problematic compared 
to the enforcement of human rights and this must be noted. However, as the expansion of liability is to 
be considered in the thesis it is useful to consider the potential impacts of amendments.  
Most of the research on white phosphorus looks at the potential for white phosphorus to be regarded 
as an incendiary weapon. It focuses on the inadequacies of the humanitarian protection offered and 
the ways to combat this. It is therefore an area that will be repeated here to highlight the significance 
of the need for change. However, in this research there will be an attempt to offer a critical analysis as 
to what the change could be and how the law should be amended. By offering this proposal, an 
addition to the literature will be presented. 
So far, the aims of the thesis have been bought forward, and white phosphorus itself has been 
discussed in detail. The effects of the munition, its role in IHL and the law surrounding the weapon 
have all been commented on. White phosphorus has varying degrees of severity, and can be fatal. Its 
destruction is strong, and once deployed there is little that can be done to control it. This has led to 
both academics and states commentating on amending the law. There does need to be change and the 
remaining chapters will argue why it should be the CCW that is amended. It will observe different 
possibilities and balance the benefits with the disadvantages of each possible change. Alleviating 
humanitarian issues is vital, and the concept of upholding the values of IHL will be focused on.  
The starting point will be to observe Zyklon B. As it has been argued that the law surrounding white 
phosphorus should be strengthened to offer better humanitarian protection the next chapter will 
consider if liability should be expanded for violations.  The dual use chemical Zyklon B and a case 
study involving Zyklon B will be assessed to consider this notion as it will be assessed and compared 
to white phosphorus.  
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3. ZYKLON B  
3.1. WHAT IS EXPANDING LIABILITY? 
The previous chapter discussed what justifications states give for using white phosphorus and the 
growing stigma of the munition. The current state of the literature was also observed. It concluded 
with stating that there does need to be change. By creating this foundation, it is possible to begin to 
look into how the law can be changed to alleviate human suffering as much as possible. The first 
consideration will be to potentially expand liability for those that violate the law and the notion of 
responsibility for complicity. Specific wording of the law would not need to be amended, but more 
subjects could be liable for exploiting the law when white phosphorus is used. Looking at all possible 
options is important, as it shows consideration for all potential outcomes and strengthens the eventual 
conclusion. This will be done as it is just one look at the possible ways in which the law for white 
phosphorus munitions can be protected. The principles and values of IHL show us that there is an aim 
to protect subjects as much as possible and to alleviate suffering. The aims discussed are vital to IHL, 
and any direction that is conflicting to these aims should face consequences to prevent the same 
happening again. 
To do this, the dual-use chemical Zyklon B will be compared to white phosphorus throughout the 
chapter. First Zyklon B will be introduced, with a description of its effects and history. Once this has 
been done, the distinguished Zyklon B case will be discussed. This case is an example where 
responsibility for complicity was presented in IHL. By looking at this case, it can be evaluated to see 
if similar proceedings could take place for white phosphorus. The advantages and disadvantages of 
expanding liability will be observed, it will conclude that even though it may help, it may not be the 
best possible change. This will lead to the next few chapters where other possibilities are presented. 
Before this conclusion can be reached, it is important to explain what is meant by expanding liability. 
In legal terms, liability concerns the subject who is legally responsible for an action.
94
 In regards to 
IHL, a person for example would be liable if they committed a war crime. If one has committed a war 
crime, a major violation in IHL would have taken place and the subject would be criminally 
responsible for their actions. To expand liability would mean for more subjects being responsible for a 
same wrong that has taken place. In regards to white phosphorus, if it has been designed for its 
incendiary qualities or targeted against civilians then it is regarded as illegal. This would make the 
subject that decided to use it in this way liable. However expanding liability would also cause another 
subject on top of this to be liable for the violation in law. This could be the state that administrated the 
use of white phosphorus, or the manufacturer of the munition itself.  
In a case involving Zyklon B, two men were convicted to death as a result of their involvement in the 
production and supply of Zyklon B during World War II.
95
 Zyklon B was invented in the early 1920’s 
in Germany and consisted of hydrogen cyanide and a cautionary eye irritant. Hydrogen cyanide is a 
poisonous gas and it interferes with cellular respiration. Appendix B briefly explains this further. 
3.2. THE ZYKLON B CASE 
Fritz Haber who is considered the 'father of chemical warfare
96’ conducted research in the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry. Haber is known for developing and 
weaponising chlorine and other poisonous gases that were used during the First World War. He is 
known as a science great,
97
 but he defended gas warfare. He believed that death was death regardless 
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of how it was inflicted and did not believe that it was inhumane. Fritz Stern says Haber must be 
remembered ‘in all his complexity’ and he was a man of ‘scientific greatness but deeply cultivated98.’ 
Haber’s research in the institute led to the founding of Degesch, which was a state controlled 
consortium. Degesch was formed to investigate and conduct research into military use of chemicals. 
This research discovered that adding a cautionary eye irritant to a less volatile cyanide compound in 
the presence of heat would become hydrogen cyanide. This could be used for military purposes, and 
the product was branded as Zyklon.  The specific research was the work of Bruno Tesch, Walter 
Heerdt and Gerhard Peters. Nazi Germany used Zyklon B in extermination camps during the 
Holocaust. Gas chambers such as Auschwitz would be filled with people forced into chambers, with 
the doors then locked shut. Zyklon B pellets would be inserted through either a vent in the roof or 
holes in the chamber and all victims would be dead within 20 minutes.
99
 Millions were killed this 
way. Prior to the war, most of the profits derived from Zyklon B were from overseas sales. The 
chemical could fumigate entire ships, buildings, barracks, flour mills, grain elevators or railroad cars 
without damaging their contents in any way. With the Second World War, profits greatly increased. 
For example, Auschwitz received a great total of 23.8 tons of Zyklon B
100
, with only 6 tons of this 
being used for fumigation. This shows that there was a lot more Zyklon B being delivered than 
needed for fumigation. Zyklon B could not have been bought in high quantities to be stored. The 
chemical only has a shelf life of three months. Joseph D. Tessier describes hydrogen cyanide as 
probably the quintessential example of a dual-use chemical.
101
  
After the conclusion of the Second World War, Tesch, Karl Weinbacher and Joachim Drosihn were 
arrested by Britain as war criminals. Tesch and Weinbacher were executed, with Drosihn being 
acquitted of the charges. This led to the Zyklon B case. When charged, it was deemed that the three 
men: 
‘In violation of the laws and usages of war did supply poison gas used for the extermination 
of allied nationals interned in concentration camps well knowing that the said gas was to be 
so used.’102 
It was claimed that they continued their involvement in the sale of Zyklon B to Nazi forces despite 
knowing that it was being used to exterminate human beings in concentrations camps and that they 
continued to do so in ever-increasing quantities. During the trial, the prosecution stated that Zyklon B 
was used for:  
‘Systematically exterminating human beings to an estimated total of six million, of whom 
four and a half million were exterminated by the use of Zyklon B in one camp alone, known 
as Auschwitz.
103’ 
Tesch's defence had to prove that he had no knowledge that Zyklon B was used for the killing of 
humans and that his delivery of Zyklon B was for the purpose of disinfection. Tesch argued that the 
quantities of Zyklon B delivered were quite normal quantities, and that any instruction course that was 
given was 'held only according to the relevant laws and regulations, and again only for the purpose of 
teaching the method of exterminating vermin.'
104
 Doctor Zippel, who defended Tesch, stated that he 
had a duty to: 
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‘Try to prove that Tesch supplied this gas not knowing for what purposes it might be used. 
My second duty is that, even if he knew something about it, still the laws of this procedure 
would not suffice to find him guilty.’105 
This would appear as a direct defence against the notion of complicity. However, his defence also 
wanted to defend against the notion of expanding liability all together. Zippel stated that even if Tesch 
was aware, the law should not find him guilty.  Tesch did not believe that he was in the wrong. He 
ended his testimony by stating ‘I was not a militant member of the Nazi Party but I was always loyal 
to the German State
106.’ Nonetheless, it was deemed that Tesch had no reason to not know what the 
true intentions of the use of Zyklon B were for. He was known as being an extremely efficient man 
with there being little chance that he could be duped.  It was stated that:  
‘To my mind, although it is entirely a question for you, the real strength of the prosecution in 
this case rests rather upon the general proposition that, when you realise what kind of man 
Tesch was. 
107
 
Karl Weinbacher was also executed for his involvement. Weinbacher it was approximated was in sole 
control of the company for around 200 days in the year. During this time, he would have had access to 
all the books and travel reports of the firm. It was deemed that he too was liable for his actions as he 
would be in a position where he was aware of what was happening.  
There was a line drawn however for the given standard for liability as Joachim Drosihn was acquitted 
of his charges. In his defence, he argued that his knowledge on the activities of the business was 
‘scanty’ and that he only became aware that the gassing of humans occurred after the capitulation of 
Germany.
108
 It was deemed that Drosihn had a subordinate position within the firm and would not 
have had the knowledge of what Zyklon B was being used for. Drosihn's role was being the firm's 
first gassing technician, and any supply of gas would be beyond his control.
109
 
Drosihn’s acquittal is very important. It shows that there is a limit and that consideration needs to be 
made to ensure that the scope of liability has not been expanded too far. His job role was limited to 
installing, repairing or maintaining gas lines. The values of IHL are imperative, and any violations of 
IHL should be prosecuted. But this does not mean that it should prosecute anyone. The acquittal of 
Drosihn shows that there was a constraint, and if liability for the illegal use of white phosphorus was 
to be expanded this would need to be considered. To ensure that this did not become a problem in the 
case of Zyklon B, the Judge Advocate for the case effectively made a three part test that needed to be 
fulfilled. 
The first part was for it to be sure that the Allied nationals had been gassed by means of Zyklon B. It 
was then needed for the gas used for extermination to be supplied by the firm. Finally, it was needed 
for the accused to have been aware that the gas they were supplying was to be used to kill humans.
110
 
Firstly, there was evidence to confirm that it was Zyklon B used in the concentration camps and that 
the Zyklon B was supplied by their firm, meaning that at this stage all three could still be liable. 
However, only Tesch and Weinbacher were in a high enough position within the firm so only they 
would have been aware that the gas was being used to kill humans. They were not the ones explicitly 
conducting crimes, but by aiding it and doing nothing to prevent it meant that they were found guilty. 
Therefore the third part of the test the Judge Advocate set was fulfilled and the defendants found 
guilty. Since the trial of Zyklon B, Article 6 of the statute of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal has 
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imposed sanctions on individuals who either contributed or cooperated to the commission of principal 
crimes. 
The Zyklon B case is an example where individuals are made accountable for their actions even 
though they are not committing the crimes themselves. This same concept could be applied to 
individuals who represent states as well as states themselves. States do not simply seek to win armed 
conflicts in the most convenient or efficient manner. States appreciate the value of winning armed 
conflicts in the best possible view of the international community.  IHL is constructed with states 
around the world agreeing on the constraints that should be set. The general consensus therefore is to 
ensure that armed conflict occurs in the most humane possible way. A method of preserving this is to 
make those that deviate from this be liable for their actions. So if there are individuals who aid states 
in violating the law, it must be considered to see if they should also be prosecuted, similar to how 
Tesch and Weinbacher were. 
3.3. RELEVANCE OF ZYKLON B AND SUPPORT OF STATES 
It can now be explained why Zyklon B has been chosen for a parallel with white phosphorus. The 
inclusion of the material needs to be justified. The first point is that they are both simply dual-use 
chemicals. It is easier to relate to a munition when the other shares similar properties. Even though 
one is considered to be a chemical weapon, the two munitions do share alike properties. Zyklon B is 
not a weapon and if used in warfare is completely illegal, and there are no justifications to using it as a 
munition. In comparison, white phosphorus has certain uses that can be legal and beneficial due to its 
versatility. When used and designed for specifically its incendiary purposes, the use of the weapon 
becomes illegal, and it is this use that is usually exploited by states.  
Another reason why Zyklon B has been chosen is because it is an example of liability being expanded 
in IHL. It can be looked at to see in the Zyklon B case how the notion of complicity was applied and 
the reasons for which it was done so. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of this can be 
observed and any of the after effects that occurred can be discussed. It can be seen why this happened, 
how it could potentially be prevented and if it would be applicable to white phosphorus.   
As noted, the growing stigma and controversy with the use of white phosphorus is there, and it is also 
another point that can be observed in regards to Zyklon B. Since the trial, great stigma has arisen in 
regards to Zyklon B. After the conclusion of the Second World War, it has only been used rarely as a 
pesticide and in industrial applications. Even though firms from the Netherlands, Germany, Japan and 
the United States still to this day use it, they do so under an alternative brand name such as 
Cyanosil.
111
 Whenever the word Zyklon is used in trade names, angry reactions have followed. British 
sportswear Umbro in 2002 issued an apology for using the name Zyklon on the box of one style of 
their trainers for numerous years.
112
 They received complaints and consequently stopped using the 
word.  Similarly, the word can be found on portable roller coasters made by the company Pinfari. This 
has led to numerous organised protests over many years to show the anger of many people for the 
continued use of the word.
113
 Zyklon B is very effective at sanitising objects and the levels of stigma 
that arose as a result of its involvement in World War II means that it is only now used for 
sanitisation. This shows how valuable stigma can be for IHL. It is a deadly chemical that is only now 
being used for commercial reasons. If a similar approach occurs for white phosphorus it could ensure 
that it is only used legally.    
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In a similar way, there are also examples emerging now of subjects not wanting to associate 
themselves with white phosphorus. It must be noted first however that Zyklon B is an agent that was 
never claimed to be used for military purposes but was in fact used for genocide. In contrast, white 
phosphorus is intended to be used for the military but it is being used inappropriately. The two 
situations are slightly different, but this does not mean that stigma cannot play the same role for white 
phosphorus. It can work in a way to prevent white phosphorus from being used inappropriately. As 
previously stated in the earlier chapters, Israel following their use of white phosphorus in the Gaza 
war originally stated that they had not used white phosphorus at all. By first stating that they were 
definitely not using the weapon, before there was no other option but to confirm that they had used the 
munition starts to show a comparable disdain. By apparently not wanting to be associated with the 
munition shows the building stigma that is associated with white phosphorus. Though not the levels of 
stigma that Zyklon B has, it shows that it has already started to occur and can therefore be a 
comparable munition.  
White phosphorus can be used legally but can still be controversial. This controversy has not 
completely yet made states reluctant to use white phosphorus. This is shown by Israel being aware of 
the stigma of the munition, but still using the weapon regardless. Although the stigma surrounding 
white phosphorus many not reach that of Zyklon B, it is growing, and a lesson can be learnt from it. 
The stigma surrounding Zyklon B is different to white phosphorus, but it is useful as it is a 
circumstance that shows what the potential end result could be. 
Comparing the stigma between the two munitions has relevance, as stigma can play a major role when 
impacting IHL. For example, cluster munitions which were first used in the 1940’s are an extremely 
unreliable and inaccurate munition. It is an explosive weapon that when used in operation ejects other 
smaller sub-munitions. These explosive smaller bombs are intended to either kill people or destroy 
objects. The wide ranging area that the munition can impact because of the bomb's release of many 
smaller bombs makes the munition pose great risk to combatants and civilians alike. If a bomb does 
not explode during the attack, it may do so later and kill well after the conflict has ended. In a similar 
way to white phosphorus, once the munition is deployed there is little that can be done to control it. 
The United States during the Vietnam War used cluster bombs against targets in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia. It has been reported that from the 260 million cluster bombs that were deployed on Laos 
between the years 1964 and 1973, around 80 million failed to explode
114
. This unreliability and 
further unintended destruction that the munition can cause generated great outcry to the use of the 
weapon.  
In 2000, the ICRC urged States to stop using the munition all together as they expressed their deep 
concerns towards the weapon.
115
 In 2007, Norway launched the ‘Oslo Process’ which sought to begin 
the process of creating an international treaty to prohibit the use of cluster bombs in armed conflict.
116
 
There were also global conferences in Lima, Vienna and Wellington, and regional meetings in Africa, 
Asia, Europe and South America to discuss the issue. The Convention on Cluster Munitions was 
consequently adopted on the 30
th
 May 2008. Over a hundred states have now joined the convention.  
Whereas once the munition was regarded as ‘morally repugnant,117’ it is now illegal. The stigma of 
the weapon impacted the development of the convention. The values and principles of IHL were 
upheld. The President of the ICRC, Jakob Kellenberger stated: 
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‘I  am  also  confident  that  the  convention  will  result  in  cluster munitions being stigmatized 
and that its impact will extend far beyond the participating states and the mere words it 
contains.
118‘ 
This shows the potential that stigmatising munitions can have by asserting that it is not limited. It can 
further preserve the values of IHL beyond just those that have signed the treaty due to the 
stigmatisation of the munition. There is potential for the munition to be completely eradicated from 
armed conflict and this is a progression from a munition being morally wrong to becoming illegal. No 
longer can those that used the munition be able to distance themselves from the consequences of the 
munition and leave those affected to carry the burden.
119
 Just as Zyklon B is only used commercially 
now, there is potential for white phosphorus to only be used in its legal way and for the law not to be 
exploited. If this was to occur, then there would be no need to amend the law. In the later chapters, 
this will discussed further. 
Even though the use of Zyklon B in the manner the Nazi forces used it was completely illegal under 
IHL, there is cynicism that there was an attempt to exploit the law. It can be argued that by 
deliberately choosing to use Zyklon B there was an attempt to avoid international criticism and also 
liability. Albert Speer who was Germany’s Minister for Armaments during the Second World War 
was asked why the vast stock piles of deadly gases were not chosen during the war, but instead 
Zyklon B. He stated: 
‘It was because at that stage of the war it was perfectly clear that under no circumstances should 
any international crimes be committed which could be held against the German people after they 
had lost the war. That was what decided the issue’120 
This shows that even at this time and for this dual-use chemical, a state was exploiting the law in an 
attempt to avoid being held accountable for certain actions. Even though the reason and manner in 
which the munition was exploited is different, it shows how it can be an issue. Whereas in the case of 
Zyklon B, two men were convicted, in regards to white phosphorus if change is made sooner, then the 
problem can be prevented. The inclusion of the material of Zyklon B can be justified for these 
reasons, as it does help reach the final conclusion because there are similarities. 
As the inclusion of the material has been justified, and expanding liability explained it can now be 
considered to see if liability should be expanded when the use of white phosphorus in armed conflict 
is exploited. Firstly, there would need to be support by states for any change to be made. It does 
appear as if there could be support. Any change that is to be proposed requires support from the 
international community otherwise there would be very little substance to the discussion as it could 
not be a likely proposition and would not likely be implemented. There are concerns with the use of 
white phosphorus within the international community. For example, Belgium states their concerns 
come from a humanitarian perspective. They believe that there is misuse of white phosphorus from 
the normal use of illuminating.
121
 The humanitarian aspect that is highlighted appears to point to the 
principles of IHL. The munition can cause unnecessary suffering when used for its incendiary 
qualities rather than its illuminating purposes and because of this, some states are not happy with how 
white phosphorus is being misused.  
Cyprus too follows the same concerns as Belgium. Cyprus states that they have concern to the 
‘humanitarian consequences of white phosphorus. And in this framework supports every initiative in 
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the direction of minimising the humanitarian impact of these weapons.’122 By supporting any initiative 
as long as it reinforces humanitarian protection shows that some states are willing to consider 
different possibilities. For this reason, if the proposition of expanding liability was made, it would not 
be instantly dismissed. There is disdain for certain munitions and change could be made. Midgley 
asks the question: 
‘Are we economically and psychologically chained to weapons technologies and policies 
which sacrifice our most positive impulses to a culture based on the planning of millions of 
deaths?
123’ 
This can be applied to the use of white phosphorus. Chapter 2 shows white phosphorus is an 
extremely effective and versatile munition. Regardless of if it is toxic and can be fatal, the weapon 
offers qualities that other weapons may not offer. But this does not mean that all states believe that it 
should be used. A nuclear weapon can kill millions in a single blast and Zyklon B is able to be used to 
kill millions of people. But IHL has been outlined to steer states and subjects in a direction that 
follows the objectives of IHL and to preserve this ideology. By not being chained to a munition that 
steers away from the objectives of IHL, the principles are upheld. There is support for upholding the 
principles of IHL, and because of this, the possibility of making more liable for the exploitation of the 
munition is likely to have some support to start the discussion. Considering this, it could be possible 
for states to agree to expanding liability for the exploitation of white phosphorus. It must be noted that 
expanding liability can only occur when there has already been a violation. For example, liability was 
expanded in the case of Zyklon B because the killing of allied nationals was a war crime, regardless of 
if Zyklon B was used or not. So to expand liability, there must already be a violation. Consequently, 
the possible changes that could occur can now be discussed. 
3.4. HOW WOULD LIABILITY BE EXPANDED? 
To expand liability, if a similar model to the case of Zyklon B is used, the potential changes that could 
be made are quite clear. In the case of Zyklon B, the manufacturer and supplier were prosecuted. If 
this was to happen for white phosphorus, it would be the person that designed the weapon. This has 
relevance as Protocol III of the CCW states that any ‘munition which is primarily designed to set fire 
to objects or to cause burn injury to persons’ is prohibited. If liability was to be expanded, the person 
who ‘primarily designed’ the munition would also be liable if there was a violation. White phosphorus 
has devastating effects and such effects cannot be controlled easily. Once the munition is deployed, 
the type of effect can differ and this is dangerous as there can be no distinction made between a 
civilian, combatant, or military target. For this reason, if a person has intentionally designed white 
phosphorus to be used for its incendiary qualities, then it seems logical that they should also be liable 
for the actions of the user if there has been a violation. As the protocol focuses on the design of the 
weapon, if a munition is designed to do something that is in violation of IHL, then they would also be 
prosecuted. This would not stop the user of the weapon being responsible for their action. 
If liability was to be expanded, it would be beneficial to adopt a similar three part test that was used in 
the Zyklon B case. If this approach was to be adopted, the following could be suitable:  
1.) White phosphorus has been primarily used for incendiary qualities 
2.) It was designed by the subject  
3.) It was designed primarily for its incendiary qualities 
This would ensure that there are limitations to who the liability is expanded to. The limits of liability 
need to be set to prevent those that have not violated the law to end up being prosecuted. The case of 
Zyklon B shows the importance of this. This sort of amendment could strengthen the law surrounding 
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white phosphorus. It would expand liability to the manufactures of the munition if they are the ones 
who designed the munition for it to be used for its incendiary qualities. In the same way that occurred 
in the Zyklon B case, if an individual is to abet a violation of IHL, then they could now also liable for 
their actions.  
There are advantages to expanding liability and these points need to be considered to see why 
expanding liability would be the best course of action. One advantage would be that the wording of 
Protocol III would not need to be altered. This would not be an easy process and if it could be avoided 
then it would prevent hassle. By expanding liability, it would make more subjects responsible for 
violating IHL. If there are more occurrences of people being prosecuted for wrongdoings then it could 
potentially lead to people thinking twice about exploiting the law and refrain from doing it 
themselves. If this was to happen, then the issue of exploitation could occur less frequently.  
It has already been discussed that white phosphorus has devastating effects and when states have used 
the munition and exploited the law there is not enough done about it. By making more liable for their 
actions, a clear stance is presented that violating the law will not be taken lightly. For this reason and 
the reasons shown so far, it does appear as if there would be advantages to expanding liability for the 
violation of IHL in regards to white phosphorus.  
3.5. WHY LIABILITY SHOULD NOT BE EXPANDED 
Even though there does appear to be advantages for expanding liability there are also possible 
disadvantages. On the surface, it could present to be too much of a risk. It would be much more 
difficult to prosecute those that violated the laws as it is a more of a worldwide issue compared to the 
Zyklon B case where it only occurred only in one state. A sense of inconsistency could ensue if one 
was to be prosecuted for violating IHL and another was not. 
Even though expanding liability would make more responsible for their actions, suffering would not 
be alleviated where suffering has occurred. There would be no direct change made to stop suffering 
where a victim has suffered. There would be no direct combat to offer humanitarian protection and 
this should be mostly prioritised. For example, a manufacturer of the weapon could design the 
munition for a manner that is legal under IHL, but the user of the weapon could still use it illegally. 
This would not prevent suffering for those who become victims of the munition and it still does not 
prevent states from being able to exploit the munition. A change that does this would be more 
suitable. The argument that the proper use of white phosphorus could enhance the fulfilment of IHL 
principles would hold weight. It has been said that in some scenarios this may be the case, but as a 
whole this would not offer the most humanitarian protection. More often than not, it would cause 
great human suffering and this is what needs to be prevented. If another more suitable change can 
ensure this, then it should be made. There is no guarantee that for example white phosphorus could 
cause less human casualties as a whole, and this premise should not be the basis of the law if it is not 
certain.  
There is also no guarantee that this would limit the misuse of the munition from occurring. Even if 
there were a higher number of prosecutions, it is likely that this would not deter others from doing the 
same. As in IHL it is hard to prosecute for a violation, there is little deterrence offered.  If there is not 
a great likelihood that the law surrounding white phosphorus is strengthened then it should not be the 
course of action that is taken.  
Some also believe that the case Zyklon B was incorrect in its conclusion.
124
 If Tesch and Weinbacher 
were not rightfully executed then justice would not have been bought forward. William Lindsey 
believes that the United Nations had a universal desire to see as many German nationals bought to 
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death. Because of this, the trials openly favoured the trial ending in the execution of Tesch and 
Weinbacher. However, there will never be a universal decision that is agreed by everyone. It was 
judicially decided that Tesch and Weinbacher should be convicted and it does not seem as if the 
decision was incorrect. This is similar to how not all states agree that there is an issue with white 
phosphorus. Those that have this view do not believe that any change should be made. For example, 
Japan asserts their view by stating that the concern in regards to white phosphorus is raised ‘by some 
of the parties and not all of us.’125 Italy states that ‘white phosphorus is not really an incendiary 
weapon’ and that the issues are not as great as perceived. 
Assessing all of the issues and arguments, it would appear that extending liability for the misuse of 
white phosphorus would not be the best possible course of action. There are other possible directions 
that could be followed. Although it could potentially make more liable for their actions when 
violating IHL, it is more valuable to seek better humanitarian protection. It cannot be said for sure if it 
will be beneficial and there is no guarantee that it offers the best humanitarian protection. States 
would still be able to exploit the law in ways that they are doing so now. There is no guarantee for 
what white phosphorus is being designed for, so it would be very difficult to prosecute the designer. It 
would ultimately lead to the same issue there is now, in that states can exploit the law and use white 
phosphorus in a way that goes against the values and principles of IHL. There is support by states for 
change, and this is good, but the correct decision needs to be made into what the change is.   
The next couple of chapters will look into different possible ways in which the use of white 
phosphorus munitions can be protected. The first will be an observation into the CWC. It can be 
argued that white phosphorus should fit within the scope of the CWC. The chapter will focus on why 
it does not, and then it will consequently argue why it should not be the CWC that is amended. By 
showing this, credibility is added in the chapter after when it is argued that the Protocol III of the 
CCW should take an effect based approach. Alternatives will have been considered and dismissed 
which will lead to the only possible outcome which is to take an effects based approach. But this 
chapter ends with the conclusion that even though there does need for some change to occur, it should 
not be liability that is expanded.  
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4. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 
4.1. THE HISTORY OF THE CWC  
The previous chapter concluded by asserting that expanding liability would not be the best possible 
change to prevent states from exploiting the law. White phosphorus was compared with Zyklon B and 
even though expanding liability could offer some advantages, other possibilities also need to be 
considered if there is a chance that better humanitarian protection is possible. On the basis of this, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be assessed to see if there is any way in which the law 
surrounding white phosphorus can be strengthened. The CWC has been chosen because similarly like 
Protocol III of the CCW, the CWC does not look into the effects of a munition. Whereas Protocol III 
of the CCW focuses on the design of a munition, the CWC looks at the purpose for which it is being 
used. For this reason, it will be considered to see if the CWC should take an effects based approach. 
By considering this point, it will assess the CWC to see if any amendments would be beneficial. It 
will ultimately conclude by stating that any amendments would not be desirable and this chapter will 
also dismiss the notion that white phosphorus should fall under the CWC in its current state.   
The CWC concerns chemical weapons and a chemical weapon is a munition that uses chemicals to 
inflict harm or death to humans. They are said to 'make deliberate use of the toxic properties of 
chemical substances to inflict death.
126’ A chemical weapon has three different configurations in 
which it can be stored. If it is self-contained, it is held in projectiles, cartridges, mines, or rockets and 
the chemical can be propelled or exploded out. It can also be delivered via an aircraft where there 
would be no explosive component. Finally, the chemicals can be in the form of a raw agent in large 
containers. If they exist in this form they are not yet a weapon that is ready to be used. A chemical 
weapon is classed as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and not a conventional weapon. 
For a repeat as to what encompasses the CWC before it is discussed refer to Appendix C. Reaching 
this stage took a series of developments and observing the progression allows us to see how loopholes 
and areas of IHL that were exploited have been dealt with in the past. This shows the issues that can 
arise from an area of IHL that does not offer enough protection and how states are able to exploit this.  
It also helps to understand how the CWC has reached a stage in which there is a total ban on chemical 
weapons.  
Dating back to 1899, the Hague Gas Declaration stated that 'projectiles the sole purpose of which is 
the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases
127
 would be illegal under international law. This 
statement would require for toxicity to be the central effect of the projectile. However there was a 
loophole as a projectile that was a combination of both gas and shrapnel would be lawful if it was the 
shrapnel that caused the dominant effect of the weapon. This prohibition meant a state was not 
allowed to use an asphyxiating gas as a weapon on its own. A debate during the 1899 Convention 
concluded with affirming ‘that the destructive effect of a shell must be greater than the effect of the 
gas emitted from it.’128 The toxicity would need to be the central effect of any projectile and therefore 
a sole purpose criterion was made. 
On the 17
th
 June 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
129
  was signed and it entered into force on 
the 8
th
 February 1928. It prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and 
bacteriological warfare. Notably however it did not prohibit the production, but solely the use of such 
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weapons. This was a result of the increasing use of large-chemical weapons, especially during the 
First World War.  
In 1914, once General Erich von Falkenhayn took over as the Chief of the German General Staff he 
ordered that experiments in using chemical weapons should begin. Germany began to consider using 
chemical weapons in the war for three distinct purposes
130
. Firstly, they were suspicious that the 
French had already begun planning to use gas themselves. Also, engaging in trench warfare often 
resulted in a stalemate. With the distance of the opposing trenches usually only a few hundred metres 
apart from each other, it was difficult to gain an upper hand. By using chemical weapons, an enemy 
combatant would need to leave their position and therefore become easily assailable. This is a similar 
concept to the shake and bake method deployed by the United States in the second battle of Fallujah. 
Major Bauer suggested that using a gas to ‘persuade’ enemy combatants to leave their line of defence 
would have a great effect.
131
 States are able legitimately weaken the military forces of the enemy and 
it would be appropriate to disable the greatest number of men possible. This prevailing principle of 
IHL allows for harm or death to be inflicted on enemy combatants.
132
 To persuade enemy combatants 
to come out of their position so that they could be killed would not directly violate a principle of IHL. 
The final reason in why experiments were ordered was because Germany was facing an issue with 
their supplies of shells, guns and other materials. With the issue of lacking resources, a more efficient 
method of armed conflict was sought.  
The loophole in the 1899 Declaration was able to be exploited during the First World War. A 
chemical powder was produced by Bayer & Co to have a lachrymatory - tear gas - effect on the 
enemy’s mucous membranes.133 When exposed to the munition, the target would be a victim of 
violent sneezing. The powder would be placed around the shrapnel of a 105mm shell meaning that 
when the shell exploded, a cloud of the irritant powder would be created. The munition was given the 
codename Ni-Schrapnell. The sole purpose of the munition was not to deploy a chemical on the 
battlefield as there was also shrapnel and explosives in the shell. This meant that the loophole of the 
Hague Convention was exploited. There is a similarity here to how white phosphorus is being 
exploited by states. The 1899 Declaration allowed for states to use a munition that did not have the 
sole purpose to deploy a chemical and white phosphorus is allowed to be used when it is not designed 
primarily for its incendiary capabilities. Even though white phosphorus is not classed as a chemical 
weapon, a comparison can be made from how the law allows for a weapon to be used in a certain 
way.  
Fritz Haber during the war believed that creating a cloud of gas to engulf the enemy defence line 
would be very beneficial.
134
 Releasing liquid chlorine from pressurised bottles would turn into a gas 
when it comes into contact with the air. With wind, the gas would be carried across no-man’s land and 
find its way into the enemy trenches. A cloud of chlorine would be generated that would follow Major 
Bauer’s suggestion at Fallujah that gas could be used to ‘persuade’ enemy combatants to leave their 
line of defence. German combatants could then follow the gas quickly without too much risk and kill 
their enemy combatants.  
After chemical weapons were used in the First World War, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was 
adopted. There was great stigma surrounding the munition after it used during the war. The munition 
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could cause horrific effects and as the war ended these effects contributed to a great deal of disdain 
towards chemical weapons. Stigma has been shown to be able to play a major role in the development 
of IHL and it is apparent here again.
135
 
Even though developing this protocol showed progress, it still had inadequacies. If a state already had 
such weapons, then they were not required to remove them and the state could still be in control of 
them. Additionally, the development of chemical weapons was not restricted, and because of this 
there would no reasonable guarantee that a state would not use chemical weapons if they had them. 
For example during the Second World War, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany used 
resources to be able to deploy chemical weapons if they wanted to use them. Even though they 
refrained, it was still there to be used if the states wanted to. 
More recently, Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran. On the 22
nd
 September 1980, Iraq attempted 
to invade Iran, and the President Saddam Hussein pursued a chemical warfare programme to achieve 
the goals of the State. Iraq used chemical weapons for several years and after three years; the United 
Nations was notified by Iran that Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iranian combatants.
136
 
These claims were verified when casualties of the chemical weapons were sent to be treated and the 
United Nations dispatched a specialist team to investigate the claims.  The United Nations confirmed 
that Iraq had used chemical weapons and they were doing so in ever increasing amounts.  
Following Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, Dunn in Chemical Aspects of the Gulf War said: 
‘It is vital to realise that the continued use of chemical weapons in the present conflict 
increases the risk of their use in future conflicts. In view of this, and as individuals who 
witnessed first-hand the terrible effects of chemical weapons, we again make a special plea to 
you to try to do everything in your power to stop the use of such weapons in the Iran–Iraq 
conflict and thus ensure that they are not used in future conflicts.
137’ 
The use of chemical weapons was on the rise and it seemed that it could increase in the future. The 
CWC was signed on the 13
th
 January 1993 to prevent this issue from spreading even further than it 
had already done so. It has already been stated that the CWC not only prohibits the use of chemical 
weapons but also the production, and requires for all chemical weapons to be destroyed. Established 
in 1997, The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) oversees and verifies 
the total destruction of all chemical weapons that have been declared. It currently has 192 member 
states and the collective goal is to prevent ‘chemistry from ever again being used for warfare, thereby 
strengthening international security.’138 Notably in regards to dual-use chemicals, the OPCW assesses 
the processing and consumption of dual-use chemicals to try and ensure that the chemicals are being 
used exclusively for their peaceful uses and nothing else.  
4.2. IS WHITE PHOSPHORUS A CHEMICAL WEAPON? 
The history of the CWC has been discussed. It is now important to see how the convention is 
interpreted and used. The reason for this is so that the notion that white phosphorus is a chemical 
weapon can be dismissed. The treaty is highly technical; it was created to permit the peaceful uses of 
chemicals whilst also having to define what activities are forbidden. Creating this balance is not easy 
to do, and the implementation of the CWC requires a continuous obligation. Thakur, Ramesh and 
Chandan describe the CWC as: 
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‘A convention that is unique among disarmament treaties for having outlawed a class of weapons, 
instituted a comprehensive verification regime, establishing its own organization responsible for 
implementing  all provisions of the treaty, and placing its own restrictions on export of dual-use 
technology.
139’ 
It needs to be shown that white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon. The reason why some 
incorrectly class it as a chemical weapon is due to some aspects of the CWC being ambiguous. This is 
why understanding how the CWC works is vital, as it helps confirm that white phosphorus should not 
be classed as chemical weapon. Once the ambiguity has been discussed it will then be considered if 
any changes to the definitions can be made to strengthen the convention and then also encompasses 
white phosphorus in its scope. Even though white phosphorus does not fall under the scope of the 
CWC, this does not mean that it should not be classed as a chemical weapon. For example, the 
chemical Thiodiglycol is a chemical that can be used in munitions that have mustard agents. It is an 
example of a chemical that is well policed by the OPCW as it also has legitimate uses. If white 
phosphorus was policed by the OPCW it would prevent the munition from being used inappropriately 
and would offer great humanitarian protection. If white phosphorus should be regarded as a chemical 
weapon, then there would be no need to amend Protocol III of the CCW, as it is of concern of the 
CWC. So for it to be argued that Protocol III of the CCW should be amended, its potential 
classification as a chemical weapon needs to be dismissed.  
Part of this ambiguity comes because the CWC only expressly states specific purposes of chemicals 
that are not prohibited by the convention. It does not expressly state what the purposes for chemical 
weapons are. Therefore the meanings of the CWC need to be interpreted to see if an individual 
chemical falls within the scope of the convention and this is difficult to do. As already discussed there 
can be chemicals like chlorine and hydrogen cyanide that can be used as weapons in armed conflict 
but also can be found in commercial products. Therefore, to determine if a dual use chemical is 
prohibited, the chemical is applied to a general purpose criterion to see whether they fit in the scope of 
the CWC.  
There are ambiguous aspects of the CWC such as what constitutes ‘temporary incapacitation’ which 
is found in Article II (2) of the CWC. This could range from just a few seconds to hours and there is 
no clear distinction. Even though the CWC is a fully functioning convention, it is still complex and 
has parts of it that do not have a definitive answer. As a consequence of this complexity, many people 
incorrectly believe that white phosphorus is a chemical weapon. There are many factors for this with 
one of them being attributable to the naming of white phosphorus as a chemical weapon by the United 
States. A former classified Pentagon intelligence document from 1995 states: 
‘Iraq has possibly employed phosphorous chemical weapons against the Kurdish population 
in areas along the Iraqi-Turkish-Iranian borders.
 140’ 
This was referring to Iraq’s use of white phosphorus against the Kurdish population. The United 
States stated that white phosphorus is a chemical weapon. A chemical weapon is classed differently to 
an incendiary in IHL and has different rules applying to it. Here the United States has a contrasting 
view as to what white phosphorus is classed as compared to their use of white phosphorus in Fallujah. 
It appears as if the Pentagon refers to white phosphorus as a chemical weapon when it is being used 
by an enemy.
141
 It also appears that there are dishonest efforts that deny and downplay the use of 
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white phosphorus when it is being used by the United States, but regard it as a chemical weapon when 
used by others. 
The United States having classed white phosphorus as a chemical weapon is an example of why there 
is confusion as to whether white phosphorus is a chemical weapon or not. It suggests that there is a 
possibility that states could consider white phosphorus as a chemical weapon.  As the CWC does not 
expressly state what ‘chemical weapons purposes’ are but only lists purposes that are not prohibited 
by the convention there will always be scope for debate especially in regards to dual-use chemicals. 
Nonetheless, white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon. It is considered to be an incendiary agent 
and not a chemical weapon because it achieves its effects through thermal energy. This is reflected by 
the United States media. The New York Times has ran numerous pieces about white phosphorus that 
emphasise that white phosphorus are incendiary weapons and are incorrectly referred to as chemical 
weapons.
142
 Nonetheless, because white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon, it does not mean that 
there should not be discussions as to whether it should be regarded as one or not. If it was to be 
regarded as a chemical weapon then there would be no need to amend Protocol III of the CCW as 
white phosphorus would be prohibited under the CWC. 
A study by Christian Castaing considered the scientific nature of white phosphorus against the CWC 
to conclude that it should be considered as a chemical weapon.
143
 The study observed the molecular 
workings of white phosphorus to do this.  Castaing argued that any munition that relies on chemical 
reactions such as the rearrangement of molecules, changes in matter, or the bonding of elements to 
produce a deadly force that is unnatural - is a chemical weapon. Considering this notion, white 
phosphorus does not exist naturally without military science and would therefore be unnatural. White 
phosphorus feeds of the oxygen in the skin and body and uses it as fuel to spread. This chemical 
reaction is argued to not be found in nature so should be considered as a chemical weapon. This is one 
argument there is for white phosphorus to be classed as a chemical weapon.  Arguments such as this 
focus on the fact that white phosphorus can be a deadly munition and therefore should be banned. The 
scientific study focuses on the notion that white phosphorus is deadly and unnatural which is the same 
for chemical weapons. For this reason, it should be considered to see if an amendment to the CWC 
should happen so it also encompasses white phosphorus.  
4.3. PEACEFUL USES OF CHEMICALS  
This thesis will conclude that the CCW should be amended and for there to be a focus on the effects 
of munitions. But to reach this conclusion other possible changes will have to also be considered. It 
will be considered to see what would need to be taken into account if the general purpose criterion 
was no longer applied to the CWC and a change was made that meant white phosphorus could fit in 
the scope of the CWC.  
Currently, Article II of the CWC uses the intended purpose of the chemical as a defining criterion 
rather than its toxicity. It focuses on what the purpose of the chemical is because it needs to balance 
the economic interests of the chemical industry, research purposes and the benefits that humanity 
receives from their peaceful uses.  For example a dual-chemical can have a legitimate use and it 
would not be logical to prohibit the chemical just because it can also be used as a chemical weapon. 
If the CWC was to be amended to encompass white phosphorus and was based on effects, there would 
have to be considerations to the legitimate uses of some chemicals. Currently the CWC is able to 
permit peaceful uses of chemicals whilst also defining what it is to completely forbidden. To do this 
the CWC divides chemicals into three distinct groups that distinguish chemicals that can have 
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legitimate purposes. For further information on these schedules, see Appendix D. These schedules 
highlight the legitimate uses of chemicals. All of these schedules show how the CWC has created a 
balance as it would not be possible to create a clear ban on all chemicals. It protects the interests of 
the chemical industry whilst also preventing it from being used inappropriately in armed conflict. If 
the CWC was to focus on effects and toxicity instead then a similar exception would be needed to 
allow for the interests of the chemical industry to be protected. Chemicals that are used legitimately 
can still have devastating effects so if a chemical because of its effects is outlawed then it would 
prevent many legitimate uses of chemicals from happening. The CWC is a complex treaty, but that 
one that works well. Even though some aspects of it are ambiguous, as a whole it fulfils its purpose 
well.  Article VI of the CWC states: 
‘Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
144’ 
This would not be possible if there was not a purpose criterion and instead an exception would have to 
be made so that chemicals that have legitimate uses could still be used. If it is deemed that there 
should be an amendment to the CWC, then there has to be a similar exception. Otherwise the 
convention would be so restrictive that it would be detrimental to other areas of humanity.   
4.4. TOXICITY 
Looking at toxicity would mean that instead of the intended purpose of the chemical, it is the strength 
of the chemical that is observed. Toxicity is to be considered as it is a way to measure effects. Any 
change that looks at possible effects is prioritised so that the values of IHL can be upheld. For this 
reason, the suitable criteria for effects would be toxicity rather than the general purpose of the 
chemical. Before it is argued why this would not be beneficial to do, toxicity should first be defined.  
When the toxicity of a substance is measured, it is the capacity to cause injury to a living organism 
that is measured. For example; a highly toxic substance will damage an organism if administered in 
very small amounts whereas a substance of low toxicity will not produce an effect unless the amount 
is very large. Horace Gerarde stated that the definition of toxicity is the: 
‘Capacity of a substance to cause injury, it is an inherent, unalterable molecular property which is 
dependent upon chemical structure. There is nothing we can do about the toxicity of a chemical 
except to know it.’145 
Measuring toxicity is not easy to do and it requires many factors to be taken into account. Firstly, 
toxicity cannot be defined without reference to the quantity of the substance administered or its dose. 
It would also need to take into account the way in which the quantity is administered. This could 
range from inhalation, ingestion or injection. There would also need to be consideration to what time 
frame the substance is distributed in. For example a dose could be administrated in a single dose or 
repeated doses. Other factors would be the type and severity of injury caused as a result of the 
substance, and the time needed to produce that sort of injury. These are all factors that would need to 
be taken into account if toxicity was to be considered.  A limit would need to be set so that a certain 
level of toxicity would be classed as a chemical weapon. This is would not be easy to do and would 
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make any amendments to the CWC a problematic matter. A possible way in which these many factors 
could be considered would be to:  
‘Make an approximate estimation of toxicity based on the chemical structure and the physical 
and chemical properties of the substance, and on known correlations of these variables with 
biological activity.
146’ 
It would also need to be considered at what point the toxicity of a chemical would need to be met for a 
chemical to fit the scope of the CWC. White phosphorus may cause injury and death to most forms of 
life but not all chemicals would have this impact. This would mean that not all chemicals would need 
to be covered by the CWC. A chemical can be divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A 
substance is classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation.
147
 
Incapacitation could be for example nausea or visual problems whereas a lethal dose would be very 
destructive and could cause death. There is no clear limit between lethal and incapacitating substances 
and this poses yet another problem. Even though usually a statistical average is referred to, it is still 
not a clear limit that is set.
 148
  
In toxicology a median lethal dose known as LD50 measures the lethal doses of a toxin, radiation, or 
pathogen and this could potentially help to measure toxicity if it was to be considered. LD50 is the 
value required for a substance needed to kill half the members of a tested population during tests.
149
 
An LD50 figure can be used as a general indicator of a substance’s toxicity as it works as a good 
benchmark. This is an approach that could be considered as it is a method that is used in toxicology 
and offers good results. It presents a possible way in measuring the effects of a chemical but this still 
not does alleviate the issues that have been shown. If a limit was set and white phosphorus classed as 
a chemical weapon on the surface it would appear to alleviate human suffering in regards to white 
phosphorus as it would prohibit white phosphorus being used in armed conflicts.   
But this would not be easy to do, because if there was to be an amendment in the law the different 
possible effects of different toxic chemicals would also need to be considered. The reason for this is 
that toxic chemicals can have either acute effects or toxic effects. An acute effect is an effect that 
occurs or develops rapidly after a single administration.
150
 Temporary acute effects can be skin 
irritation, sickness, nausea and permanent effects can be blindness, scars or mental impairment.
151
 
Usually, acute toxicity can be found within minutes of being exposed. Whereas a chronic effect is 
often a result of repeated or prolonged exposures.  Generally, chronic toxicity becomes apparent many 
years after exposure has taken place. It would also have to be considered to see if one type of effect 
would take priority over the other. The general purpose criterion does not have this sort of issue. By 
focusing on the purpose of the chemical, there is less ambiguity. In contrast if the effects of a 
chemical are considered then there is a lot more to consider and more possibility that there is 
ambiguity.  
As argued, the values and principles of IHL want to prevent human suffering as much as possible, and 
the previous chapters have deemed that a way of doing this would be for there to be a focus on the 
effects of munitions. If a convention does not focus on effects and there is a possibility that better 
protection can be made, then it should be made. However, in the case of the CWC, this would not be a 
suitable amendment. In the paragraphs above, the different conditions that would need to be 
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considered have been highlighted and this would not be an easy amendment to make. There are many 
issues to consider in regards to the CWC and even if toxicity was to be looked at and white 
phosphorus was to be classed as a chemical weapon, there would be a lot of ambiguity as to what sort 
of effects would result in a prohibition from the convention.   
White phosphorus is just one munition in the array of resources that can be used in armed conflict. 
Even though white phosphorus is a chemical, it is not a chemical weapon. It is not a munition that is 
designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals but 
instead it does so through thermal energy.  There is no logical amendment to the CWC that could 
make white phosphorus fit within its definition. If the CWC was to take an effects based approach, 
setting an effects threshold that would need to be met would not be rational. There would be many 
factors to consider and toxicity does not have a definitive definition. For white phosphorus to fit in the 
scope of the CWC there would need to be amendments made, and this has been shown to not be a 
rational amendment to make. Even though there does need to be change in IHL to strengthen the law 
surrounding white phosphorus, it should not be the CWC.  
To conclude the chapter it is important to reiterate that white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon –
nor should it be considered so. The arguments that have been presented show that the general purpose 
criterion is a necessity and should not be changed. There should be no amendments to the CWC to 
also cover white phosphorus. The current schedules that the CWC has deals with the issue of 
balancing the legitimate uses of chemicals well and there would be no beneficial reason to change 
this. The previous chapters have stated there should be an amendment in the law, but this change 
should not be the CWC nor by expanding liability. The next chapter will assess the CCW and state 
why it should be this convention that should be changed over others. It will look into why Protocol III 
of the CCW should be amended to take an effects based approach. This change will uphold the 
principles of IHL in the best possible manner. The law surrounding white phosphorus still needs to be 
strengthened but it is of no concern to the CWC.   
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5. THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN 
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
5.1. THE HISTORY OF THE CCW 
The previous chapter concluded with stating that the CWC should not be amended to also cover white 
phosphorus. It was argued that any change would be detrimental to the CWC and that the CWC is of 
no concern to white phosphorus. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) can 
consequently now be discussed. Protocol III of the CCW will be assessed and this chapter will 
conclude by stating that the CCW should be amended and that the protocol should take an effect 
based approach rather than a design based one. Reaching this conclusion will be the result of having 
considered other possible changes in IHL that could be made to protect the values and principles of 
IHL. However it will ultimately be decided that the most beneficial way to protect the law 
surrounding white phosphorus will be to amend the CCW. This chapter will look to observe in what 
way taking an effects based approach should be determined and what considerations would need to be 
taken to do this. Before this is to be done, there will be a brief look into the history of incendiary 
weapons in armed conflict, the CCW and of Protocol III. It will observe whether white phosphorus 
can be interpreted to be classed as an incendiary weapon in its current state instead of amending the 
law. If better humanitarian protection for white phosphorus could be offered without amending the 
law then it should be considered a possibility as it would be easier to apply. Appendix E is a reminder 
to the areas of Protocol III that have already been stated. However, Article 2 of the CCW also has 
relevance and it will play a role in this chapter. Article 2(1) states it is: 
‘Prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians 
or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.’152 
This article from the CCW says that civilians can never be the subject of attack by incendiary 
weapons and this would appear to offer good humanitarian protection. However, later on in the 
chapter it will be discussed how this article has played a role in showing the lack of strength that 
Protocol III of the CCW has as a whole. Both Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) will be discussed and there 
will be proposed changes as they do not offer enough humanitarian protection. But first, the CCW in 
which Protocol III can be found in entered into force on the 2
nd
 December 1983 and the convention 
covers landmines, booby traps, incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons and clearance of 
explosive remnants of war. These are the five protocols that encompass the CCW. The CCW aims to 
set guidelines to protect civilians and combatants from injury to weapons and from unnecessary 
suffering. As of now there are 123 parties to the CCW and 112 state parties to Protocol III.
153
 It will 
be argued that currently Protocol III of the CCW is not fulfilling its aims as well as it could do.  
Even though the CCW is an umbrella convention that covers other types of munitions as well, there 
will only be considerable focus to Protocol III of the CCW which concerns incendiary weapons. 
Using fire as a weapon has played a role in armed conflicts for centuries even before the introduction 
of gunpowder in the 15
th
 century. Munitions that were regarded as incendiary and were found before 
the invention of gunpowder were weapons such as incendiary arrows and firebombs. Progressively 
the use of incendiary weapons grew and during the First World War Germany added flamethrowers to 
their arsenal and by the 1930's the Geneva Disarmament Conference was giving serious consideration 
                                                          
152 Protocol III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Art 2(1) 
153 ibid 
43 
 
to incendiary weapons.
154
 There was an increasing use of incendiary weapons in armed conflicts 
around the world and an increasing suffering from the victims of the weapons. 
As previously noted, during the Cold War when the Vietnamese village Trang Bang was bombed and 
the photograph of Phan Thi Kim Phuc was shown around the world the stigma of incendiary weapons 
grew. This was not an isolated incident and there were many more cases in which the increasing use 
of incendiary weapons in armed conflicts around the world can be shown. 
The Bombing of Tokyo was conducted by the United States during World War II. Around 75,000–
200,000 civilians were killed with roughly 1,000,000 being displaced from their homes.
155
 The 
majority of bombs dropped on Japan were from a B-29 Superfortress strategic bomber and this is the 
bomb that was used in the Bombing of Tokyo. This type of bomb has a range of up to 3,250 nautical 
miles and would be used to drop incendiary bombs. Over a 1000 tonnes of incendiaries would be 
dropped at once causing devastating effects.
156
 The bombing of Tokyo on the 9
th
 March 1945 was the 
single deadliest air raid of World War II and as a single event was greater than Hiroshima or 
Nagasaki. This puts into context how much of an issue incendiary weapons were becoming as a 
higher number of people were being affected than ever before.
157
 A.C. Grayling looks at the bombing 
of civilians in Tokyo and questions whether it was justified by the necessities of war or if it was a 
crime against humanity, once again raising the question of the morality of such weapons.
158
 
By the 1970's the ICRC had a series of meetings following the widespread use of napalm and other 
incendiary weapons and these meetings were because of the humanitarian consequences of the 
weapons. The impact that the effects of the munition had was the focus of the discussions. The effects 
of the munition were too great and it was becoming more of a widespread issue. A munition that can 
have a greater impact than a nuclear bomb has ever had in a single event needed to be regulated. In 
1980 the CCW was created alongside its three initial protocols. One of the initial protocols was 
Protocol III. 
This is an illustration of the series of events that led to Protocol III of the CCW being drafted.  Over 
the years however there has not been a complete vote of confidence for Protocol III. This has been a 
result of weapons such as white phosphorus playing a more dominant role in armed conflict and 
Protocol III’s lack of dealing with it adequately. Particularly as can be shown by the Fourth Review 
Conference of the CCW (2011) it is because there is no universal agreement on various aspects such 
as the definition of incendiary weapons.
159
  There are many commentators on Protocol III that range 
from states themselves, to academics and non-governmental organisations that agree with this stance. 
They state that international support for strengthening existing law on incendiary weapons is growing 
and that loopholes and inconsistent restrictions have limited the effectiveness of the protocol.
160
 The 
prevailing argument is that if a munition can cause the same kind of harm as an incendiary weapon 
then it should be treated in the same way. If a weapon is needed to be primarily designed to cause 
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incendiary effects then multi-purpose munitions such as white phosphorus are able to elude Protocol 
III of the CCW. 
5.2. PROTOCOL III NEEDS TO BE AMENDED 
There should be a great desire to strengthen the regulation of white phosphorus in a better way than it 
currently is being done so. This is because white phosphorus is not regarded as an incendiary weapon 
under Protocol III of the CCW.  As the weapon has various capabilities it is not regarded as an 
incendiary as it is not a weapon which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn 
injury to persons through the action of flame or heat. This loophole where a state can use the weapon 
and create effects that are the same as an incendiary weapon but not be classed as one has led to 
international support being generated for white phosphorus to fall within the definition. There is 
sustenance in trying to close this loophole so that the effects of the weapon can be supported more by 
law.  Under the definition of Protocol III, the nature or magnitude of the impact of a weapon is not 
taken into account. As long as a weapon is found to have a primary purpose that is not to set fire then 
it is beyond the scope of Protocol III and this is concerning. A weapon that contains white phosphorus 
and is used for a distinct purpose such as to illuminate or obscure would be considered as an 
incidental incendiary effect when fire is produced. The definition of what is not to be regarded as an 
incendiary is too broad and is why white phosphorus escapes its regulation.  
The reason why white phosphorus is not classed as an incendiary weapon has been discussed. The 
devastating effects of the weapon are the same as an incendiary weapon, and incendiary weapons are 
regarded to be a munition that goes against the values and principles of IHL. If a weapon is deemed to 
be an incendiary munition then civilians and combatants both have strong protection against the 
munition. Because of the fact that the definition of an incendiary weapon given in Protocol III allows 
for multi-purpose munitions such as white phosphorus to escape regulation there needs to be an 
amendment made. The classification of an incendiary is based on the discretion of the manufacturer or 
user instead of taking consideration into the weapon's incendiary effects. An example of why it is a 
broad definition can be highlighted well with this illustration in the following scenarios.
161
 
A commander who is conducting a military operation can decide to use white phosphorus to obscure 
his unit’s movement through a city that is occupied by civilians, civilian objects, enemy combatants 
and military objects. He can legally do this if he reasonably determines that the principles and values 
of IHL are met. If the principles are met, even if there was incidental civilian casualties and damage to 
civilian objects the act would still be legal. However, if the same commander instead decided to use 
white phosphorus to burn enemy positions in the same city, and with the same amount of incidental 
civilian fatalities and damage to civilian objects then this would now be a violation of IHL and 
therefore be illegal. There is only one discernible difference between the two scenarios and that is the 
commander’s reasoning for using white phosphorus. The consequences are exactly the same but the 
way IHL views the two cases are very different. This highlights the legal distinction between the non-
incendiary and incendiary uses of white phosphorus and the glaring loophole that is therefore a 
consequence. This shows how the same effects result in one scenario being legal and the other illegal. 
This scenario will later on in this chapter be further explored when it is considered what changes 
would need to be made Protocol III if it was to amended to take an effects based approach.  
It has been argued so far that there does need to be an amendment made to offer better humanitarian 
protection. The chapters have discussed the effects of white phosphorus in detail and the effects it can 
have to civilians and combatants. It showed how these effects go against the values and principles of 
IHL. This can be enough to argue why there does need to be change but there are also other factors 
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that can be considered which when considered can strengthen the argument as to why change is 
needed. 
There are occurrences where Protocol III has been undermined and it shows the lack of reverence that 
Protocol III has to the international community. An illustration of this is through the United States 
creating a reservation when going to ratify the protocol. A reservation is defined by the VCLT to be a: 
'Unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.'
162
 
This means that if a state has made a reservation, then they are intending to for example accept a 
treaty but with their own exception to a certain aspect of the treaty. When a reservation is made it 
must be done so at the time of when a treaty is accepted and cannot be done after. It is also not 
necessary for a state to have formally acceded to the VCLT to make a reservation as it is regarded as 
international customary law. When the United States consented to be bound by Protocol III they 
included a reservation. The reservation stated that the United States reserved the right to: 
'Use incendiary weapons against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians 
where it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage 
than alternative weapons.'
163
 
If this reservation was to be accepted, then the United States would be creating an exception to 
Protocol III’s Article 2(2) prohibition on using airdropped incendiary weapons in civilian areas. Not 
only this but it would also exempt the United States from the Article 2(3) requirement that states that 
it is prohibited to use incendiary weapons to attack military targets in civilian areas unless they are 
'clearly separated from the concentration of civilians.'
164
 By doing this, the United States would have 
their own exemption from being bound by the protocol in certain circumstances. This shows an 
example of a state clearly undermining the protocol. Even though the VCLT forbids states from filing 
reservations that are ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty,165’ the United States 
attempted to circumvent Protocol III’s rules on the use of incendiary weapons. If this reservation was 
to be accepted then military commanders from the United States would be given a great deal of 
discretion when using incendiary weapons in the concentration of civilians which other states would 
not have. This premise is based on incendiary weapons potentially being able to be less dangerous to 
civilians in certain circumstances than other legal weapons. An illustration of this can be seen in 
Chapter 2 where it was shown that the number of civilian casualties in the second battle of Fallujah 
was not a high number. The United States is arguing that they would like discretion in circumstances 
where they deem that using a weapon such as white phosphorus could limit the overall casualties of 
the conflict. However, if this discretion is given to the United States, then it opens up the possibility of 
other states wanting similar discretion. Even though a reservation is needed to be made upon signing 
or ratifying a treaty, if another state deems that using an incendiary could limit the effects then they 
would likely to do the same. If the United States can demand for the right to use incendiaries in 
civilian areas contrary to the requirements of Protocol III then it makes it more difficult to convince 
states of the impermissibility of such attacks.
166
  The protocol will be undermined and humanitarian 
protection will not be as strong as it should be.  This would undermine the protocol. If states are 
suddenly able to have their own discretion when using such munitions then the protocol becomes 
meaningless. States are able to decide when they use the munition or not and it offers them a high 
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degree of control. They are no longer limited by this article of the protocol. In some cases civilian 
casualties may be less, but as a whole it would likely mean more civilians are in danger as there could 
be more control for more states.  
Jan Klabbers helps reiterate this point in ‘Accepting the Unacceptable? A New Nordic Approach to 
Reservations to Multilateral Treaties.’ Klabbers states that creating a reservation does not usually 
prevent the State from getting what they desire.
167
 If a reservation is made and a party to the treaty 
after a period of 12 months remains silent then it is deemed that they have accepted the reservation. 
The only way in which to object to a reservation is to expressly object. As a result of this, a state’s 
reservation is not likely to ever prevent them from getting the reservation that they want. An 
illustration of how this can happen can be seen by the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case.
168
 
In this case, France ratified the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf but when doing so made 
numerous reservations. The United Kingdom who had already ratified the convention notified the 
convention that they were ‘unable to accept the reservations made by the French Republic.’169 This is 
an illustration of a state when ratifying a convention making a reservation instantly and also another 
state party objecting the reservation within the 12 month period.  
As a consequence of this objection by the United Kingdom the issue arose as to the effect of the 
French reservation now that the United Kingdom had made an objection. The French argued that 
because they had made a reservation that was not accepted by the United Kingdom, there was now no 
agreement between the parties to the terms of the Article. Therefore this would mean that there was 
no application to the Article for France. The United Kingdom opposed this view and argued that their 
rejection to the reservation would mean that the convention would still have to apply to France  
regardless of whether the reservation was accepted or not. It was concluded that the VCLT favours the 
reserving state at a cost of the objecting state.  
There is an argument given by J.G. Merrills that states if a state has made a reservation they are doing 
so in the knowledge that their reservation may come under scrutiny and that they have accepted the 
possibility that the reservation might have objections and be rejected.
170
 This means that a reserving 
state willingly takes the risk of the reservation being considered as incompatible. But this does not 
seem to be the case. The consequence of the 1977 Anglo-French Continental Shelf case shows that a 
state making a reservation will be the state that is favoured. This ultimately shows that because the 
United States made a reservation to Protocol III it would appear that they are doing so in the 
knowledge that they are likely to get what they desire. They either get the reservation that they want 
and if not, they would not be bound by Protocol III. Merrills says that there is a possibility that the 
reservation may be rejected but this does not mean that a state will not still be favoured. Anthony Aust 
states that: 
‘If one or more contracting states have objected to the reservation as being prohibited, the 
reserving state must decide whether or not it is prepared to be a party without the reservation; 
and until it has made its position clear it cannot be regarded as a party
171.’ 
This shows how the United States would be favoured. If a contracting state objects the reservation, 
then they have the choice whether to be a party to the convention without the reservation. They would 
not be regarded as a party until they make their position clear. This means that the United States 
would only be ratifying Protocol III if it is under their conditions and with their exceptions. 
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This shows the problems that can arise if a protocol does not work as well as it should do. There is an 
issue of multi-purpose munitions not being covered by Protocol III and the strength of the protocol 
diminishes as a result. The United States have made a reservation to the protocol that gives them a lot 
of discretion in regards to incendiary weapons. If the protocol was more direct and did not have 
aspects that do not offer enough humanitarian protection, then the protocol would not be undermined 
as it is being done so. Change needs to be made, and there does appear to be support for this to be 
done. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) state that a weapon that can produce the same incendiary 
effects as an incendiary munition should be treated in exactly the same way
172
. They have called on all 
states that are party to the CCW to review and revaluate the inadequacy of Protocol III from a 
humanitarian perspective. They state that Protocol III has failed: 
‘To live up to its promise of protecting civilians from the effects of incendiary weapons which 
cause horrific burns, permanent disfigurement and death.’173 
The non-governmental organisation Article 36 also agrees with the HRW and says that Protocol III 
needs to address its inadequacies in preventing humanitarian harm caused by weapons with incendiary 
effects.
174
 Article 36 is a United Kingdom based organisation that works to prevent the unnecessary 
and unacceptable harm caused by certain weapons in armed conflicts around the world. Its name 
refers to Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. This protocol 
requires for states to review means and methods of warfare and new weapons. Article 36 states that 
they have particular concerns over the use and impact of white phosphorous munitions in populated 
areas and agree with the notion that change needs to be made.
175
  
The HRW also comments on the fact that once white phosphorous has been deployed; it cannot be 
used in a way that discriminates between combatants and civilians in populated areas. This point goes 
back to the earlier concern that white phosphorus cannot be managed or controlled once it has been 
deployed. There are many states that are open to examining Protocol III.
176
 This is a high number of 
states that are actively seeking for better protection to be offered. It shows that the time for change is 
now as support for it is high. It is not just states that support for some examination into Protocol III to 
be made. As already noted there have been investigations to the use of white phosphorus and the 
Goldstone Report stated that there were alternatives instead of white phosphorus that could have been 
used and would have been less harmful. These alternatives would not have the ‘the toxicities, 
volatilities and hazards that are inherent in the chemical white phosphorous’177 but still uphold the 
valuable techniques of being able to illuminate and obscure the battlefield.  The Goldstone Report 
stated that consideration should be made in banning white phosphorus as an obscurant. One way in 
doing this would be to take an effects based approach rather than a design based one as it would 
prevent white phosphorus being able to be used as an obscurant all together. It would no longer be 
allowed for a munition to be used as an obscurant weapon if it was to also have incendiary effects as 
well.  
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With there being so many states and subjects that are willing to start dialogue on Protocol III, it shows 
that the time to revisit Protocol III is now. The demand is high to do so and if there is high demand 
then it must be an extremely big issue that needs to be dealt with. A loophole is created by an 
incendiary weapon needing to be designed to be used for its incendiary qualities. However this 
discretion does not help protect civilians or combatants alike from becoming a victim of the shocking 
effects of the munition. There are references that cite that white phosphorus has caused superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering in some circumstances and this would go against the principles of 
IHL.
178
 If there is a munition that goes against these values then it should prohibited.  As there does 
appear to be backing for an amendment and many reasons why it should happen, a look into what 
specific amendments that needs to take place can occur. 
5.3. HOW PROTOCOL III SHOULD BE AMENDED 
Amending Protocol III of the CCW for it to have an effects based approach would not be an 
unprecedented move for the CCW. The CCW already has an effects based definition for one of its 
prohibitions. Protocol I of the CCW which concerns non-detectable fragments states:  
‘It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments 
which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.’179 
This is an example of the convention already having a protocol that focuses on the effect that a 
weapon has rather than its design or purpose. However it must be noted that Protocol I has reference 
to the primary effects of weapons that can injure. If the same was to be applied directly to Protocol III 
then it could be argued that the primary effect of a munition such as white phosphorus is its screening 
qualities just as much as its incendiary qualities. This argument will be dealt with when the possible 
changes are proposed, but it does help to observe Protocol I as it can be seen how it operates and what 
needs to be done to ensure that the protocol exists in its best possible state.  From a humanitarian 
perspective, adopting a definition of incendiary weapons that is based on the effects of the weapon 
and what sort of damage it can cause would offer the most protection. 
Lessons can be learnt from Protocol I of the CCW and it is useful to note that Protocol I does not 
practically prohibit any conventional weapon in existence. It adds that it must be a munition that 
injuries with fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays. This addition is vital, 
and a similar provision would need to be applied to Protocol III if it was to take a similar approach. 
There is a need for this so that not all munitions or resources that have similar effects to incendiary 
weapons are now prohibited by the CCW.  There needs to be a line drawn and a balance made for 
what sort of effects is to be prohibited by the convention. There are numerous possibilities that could 
result in similar effects to white phosphorus from occurring. For example a resource as simple as 
petrol could cause the same sort of effects as white phosphorus. Petrol is a liquid that is primarily used 
as fuel for engines. It is very volatile and if it is leaked and there is a source of ignition present then it 
is very dangerous. If petrol is unconstrained it can burn rapidly and become flammable. If this was to 
occur then the effects of the petrol could be similar to white phosphorus. The ignition could spread 
and it could burn civilians and damage civilian objects.  However this does not mean that it should be 
prohibited under Protocol III. Just because there would now be an effects based approach not 
everything that could cause similar effects would need to be prohibited. Chapter 4 commented on the 
importance of ensuring that resources that have legitimate uses outside of armed conflicts should not 
be restricted by IHL. For this reason it should be considered how to expand the definition of Protocol 
III without instances such as this also being encompassed by the convention. In addition to this even 
other munitions that could have similar effects do not need to be the focus for the CCW. The CCW 
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concerns itself only with conventional weapons and these are weapons that are relatively widely used 
and not weapons of mass destruction which would be munitions such as nuclear bombs or a biological 
weapon. However, if a bomb was deployed and its secondary effects caused surrounding areas to set 
on fire as a result of numerous different factors then there would need to be a way which to ensure 
that it is not of concern of the CCW but instead another aspect of IHL.   Any amendment of Protocol 
III would need to ensure that these two possibilities do not become an issue. As a result of this, these 
points will be considered when the changes are proposed. 
When suggesting the following proposition these notions will have taken place. It is recommended 
that instead of Article 1(1) stating an incendiary is any weapon or munition which is primarily 
designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons it should instead state that an 
incendiary weapon is: 
‘Any weapon or munition which has the primary or secondary effect to set fire to objects or to 
cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, 
produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.’ 
By amending the law to take a similar provision to this it would alleviate a lot of the issues that have 
been raised so far. The protocol would now focus on the effects that a weapon has instead of the 
design of it. It has a provision that a munition that is able to cause devastating effects even through its 
secondary effects will also be regulated under Protocol III. This would deal with the issue of dual-use 
chemicals avoiding regulation as it could no longer be argued that white phosphors is being used for 
its screening qualities. If it is used in this way, but can still cause effects that set to fire to objects or 
cause burn injury then it will still be prohibited. This would offer better humanitarian protection.  It 
would not make a difference why or how the weapon is being used. But if it results in causing burn 
injury as a result of fire produced by a chemical reaction then it should be prohibited. The issue that 
was raised with the need to ensure that the protocol does not cover instances where a conventional 
munition has not been used will also be combated with this definition and how this is done will be 
discussed later. 
5.4. WHAT WOULD CHANGE? 
Defining incendiary munitions with a primary and secondary effect would now ensure that the law 
cannot be violated and that human suffering is alleviated. It would no longer be possible for white 
phosphorus to escape the regulation of Protocol III. It could not be argued that the effect of the 
weapon is not the damage caused but its illuminate or obscurant qualities as this would have no 
relevance. If it can produce the devastating effects for whatever reason, then it would now be 
prohibited to use. There would no longer be a loophole. 
With this definition made, most of the issues that have already been considered will have been dealt 
with. Nonetheless there needs to be a way in which to not prohibit other munitions that should not 
have relevance to the protocol. As the convention would now also regard secondary effects as relevant 
then it would need to ensure that this definition is not too broad and only encompasses dual-use 
chemicals and not weapons that are not relevant to the CCW. A munition such as an atomic bomb 
may cause fire or burn injury but this would not need to be regulated by the CCW. A munition such as 
this would not be a conventional munition so would therefore not regulated by the CCW. A 
conventional munition is a weapon that is relatively widely used. A munition like an atomic bomb is 
not a conventional weapon. This would not limit the level of humanitarian protection that is offered. 
Other areas of IHL that are more relevant would then be applied rather than the CCW. This 
amendment however would strengthen the regulation of incendiary weapons and particularly white 
phosphorus. There is also a need for a chemical reaction to take place for the fire to have been caused. 
This is another limit that is placed so it is ensured that it only concerns incendiary weapons.   
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The word secondary means the next in order, so a secondary effect can be regarded as being 
consequential to another effect. If Protocol III is to also encompass effects that are secondary, there 
does need to be a limit and this can be set by affirming what is to be defined as secondary. If it is not 
further defined, then the interpretation is left too broad and a resource such as petrol could fall within 
its scope. There are many factors that could be interpreted to be a secondary effect. It could be an 
effect that occurs in the short-term or long-term. It could be argued that it is also an effect that impacts 
the environment. To prevent the definition being interpreted broader than it should be, a secondary 
effect should defined and seen as an accompanying effect. This would be an effect that occurs at the 
same time as the primary effect and an effect that is likely to always occur. This would ensure that 
effects that occur in the long-term are not interpreted to fall within the scope of Protocol III. A 
munition such as white phosphorus would fit under the definition. The primary effect of white 
phosphorus could be illumination; however in the same sequence of events it can also cause fires and 
burn injury. This would be the secondary effect and therefore the weapon would be prohibited under 
the protocol. An accompanying effect would be regarded as an effect that is likely to happen when the 
normal use of the resource occurs. A normal use of white phosphorus like illumination would be 
expected to also produce fire as a result. In contrast to this, a normal use of petrol would be to power 
an engine. Even though petrol is a highly flammable substance, it is not expected to cause a fire in this 
scenario.  It could potentially cause similar effects but as it not expected it would not fall under the 
definition of an incendiary weapon. By having this definition it would ensure that the definition of an 
incendiary weapon is not too broad but is broad enough to offer better humanitarian protection for 
dual-use munitions.  
These are not the only considerations that need to be made however. There would also need to be 
consideration into the level of effects needed to be relevant to Protocol III. This needs to be a strong 
secure definition as to not create any ambiguity. For example, as mentioned the CWC defines a toxic 
chemical to be: 
‘Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.
180’ 
There is no clear indication as to what is regarded as temporary incapacitation. A limit is set but there 
is no suggestion as to where the line is drawn for it to be regarded that a chemical action has not 
caused temporary incapacitation. There will always be a sense of ambiguity on this aspect of the 
CWC unless it is further defined. For this reason, a limit needs to be well defined for the CCW. 
A simple burn injury would not be suitable as it could be interpreted to be a burn that only has a slight 
discomfort and does not inflict much damage. Instead if it is defined that the burn injury needs to be 
severe enough to be able to cause death or permanent damage and harm then the correct level of 
humanitarian protection would be covered. It would prevent the protocol from applying to any level 
of discomfort whilst also covering effects that need to be prevented which would go against the values 
of IHL. Superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering would be a burn injury that is more painful than it 
should be and amending the law to cover this aspect would protect these values of IHL. White 
phosphorus would be covered with this amendment as it has been shown how severe the effects of the 
munition are and it would be interpreted that it does produce an effect that is severe enough to cause 
death or permanent damage and harm. 
Strict liability would have to occur if Protocol III was to take an effects based approach once there 
was a violation. The scenario of a commander deploying white phosphorus for two different reasons 
that was shown earlier in the chapter has relevance here once again. The two contrasting scenarios 
that were presented show a different state of mind of the commander. Even though the same effects 
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would have occurred, in one the commander was aware that he was violating the law. The knowledge 
that you are committing a crime is mens rea and it plays an important role in law when someone has 
committed a crime. The principle requires both a mental and physical element. Actus reus is the act 
itself with mens rea being the awareness that a conduct is a crime. The commander who used white 
phosphorus to burn enemy combatants would be doing so with a guilty mind and it would be a 
scenario where a mens rea criterion has been fulfilled. If Protocol III was to take an approach based 
on effects then there would be no need for a mens rea criterion. It would no longer be relevant if white 
phosphorus was being used for its obscurant qualities as its incidental incendiary effects would now 
be classed as a secondary effect and would fit the definition of an incendiary weapon.  
Regardless of what the intentions of the user are when using white phosphorus they would be found 
liable for their actions. The effects of the munition are what are prioritised and it would not matter if 
the commander intended to use the munition to illuminate the battlefield. The same devastating effects 
would have taken place. This would offer better humanitarian protection as regardless of the person’s 
awareness of the crime they would be in violation of IHL. There would be no defence to using the 
munition because it would now be regarded as an incendiary weapon and would be prohibited to be 
used. This is what is meant by strict liability. It does not depend on the intent of the person and the 
law would find them liable regardless of their intent. This would have to occur for an effects based 
approach to work.  
5.5. REASONS NOT TO AMEND PROTOCOL III 
Consideration also needs to be made to why Protocol III should not be amended. If there is a way to 
offer better protection and continue to uphold the values and principles of IHL then it should be taken 
as it would prevent the need to amend Protocol III whilst also offering the same benefits. This is why 
it would be valuable to confirm that change does actually need to be made. If it is deemed that there is 
not another possibility then the proposed changes hold higher validity as it would appear to be the 
only plausible way in which humanitarian protection can be offered in a better way. 
There is a possibility that if the international community is already against white phosphorus then 
there is no need to amend the law. There have been examples given that show that when a great 
majority of the international community shares a view then it can become emerging customary law. If 
the international community consider that using white phosphorus is already illegal then no change 
needs to be made. The nature of the munition would be seen to go against the values and principles 
such as the prohibition to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. If this belief was there 
then it gradually would become customary law which would prevent the need to amend Protocol III of 
the CCW. There is a test to determine whether a law has become international customary law. The 
International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons commented 
that state practice and opinio juris need to be fulfilled for law to be regarded as international 
customary law
181
. State practice concerns the actual behaviour of states and opinio juris is the 
subjective belief of a state that their action is because they believe it to be legal obligation to do so. In 
regards to white phosphorus this means that states are not using white phosphorus for its incendiary 
qualities because they already deem it illegal to do so. For this reason then, it needs to be confirmed 
that using white phosphorus has not become customary international law. It does not appear as if 
states are refraining from using white phosphorus because they deem it to be illegal. It has been 
reported already that states such as Israel have tried to hide the fact that they have used the munition. 
This shows that it is more leaning towards the stigma surrounding the weapon rather than because 
they deem it to be legally binding not to. It has not yet reached a level in which the high majority of 
states are not using the munition because they deem it to be illegal. They just do not want to be 
associated with it rather than the subjective belief of the state that it is a violation.  
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There are also some states that do not support for there to be change and this needs to be combated. A 
look into the arguments made by such states need to be observed to see if the reasons for this stance 
holds validity. If the argument given by opposing states to any amendments holds weight then it 
should be considered another reason as to why Protocol III being amended is not the best course of 
action. Italy has stated that ‘white phosphorus is not really an incendiary weapon.’182 If this argument 
is correct, then Protocol III is of no concern to the CCW. However, the characteristics of white 
phosphorus show that it is an incendiary weapon. It is a chemical that can be used to set fire to a 
person and cause a burn injury through the flames and heat produced by a chemical reaction. It may 
not be classed as incendiary weapon under the current law, but it is an incendiary. It can cause the 
same effects as a munition that is regarded as an incendiary weapon under the CCW so it should be 
classed as one. An incendiary is a device that can be used to cause fires and this is what white 
phosphorus can do. It has already been argued that white phosphorus even though is not an incendiary 
weapon under the current definition, should be because it has the same effects. It should not matter 
that it is designed for another purpose if it can have the same shattering effects as an incendiary 
weapon. By taking an effects based approach, this argument given by Italy would no longer hold any 
validity as IHL would now be concerned with the effects of an incendiary munition rather than its 
purpose. It would be classed as an incendiary munition and be prohibited.  
5.6. CONCLUSION 
Some arguments as to why Protocol III of the CCW should not be amended to take an effects based 
approach have been presented. These reasons must be balanced with the arguments for there to be 
change so this chapter can conclude by stating that the protocol should be amended. If the values and 
principles of IHL are to be considered, then IHL would be benefited if an effects based approach was 
made. Humanitarian protection is the pinnacle of what constitutes IHL and it is a vital element of 
what treaties, conventions and customary law seek to preserve. For this reason, this should always be 
the priority and if there is room to offer this protection in a greater way, then it should be taken. It 
should not matter if there is little number of states that do not want change to be made. There will 
never be a universal agreement on all issues and the decision should be made to prioritise 
humanitarian protection and the values of IHL. There does need to be an amendment made as there is 
no way currently this protection can be offered if no change occurs. It does not appear as if using 
white phosphorus incorrectly is becoming customary law. There is also not a way that Protocol III in 
its current state can be interpreted to encompass white phosphorus. Ultimately, it seems that the only 
possible way to offer this protection and to maintain the principles of IHL would be to make an 
amendment to the law.  
This chapter concludes by stating that Protocol III of the CCW should take an effects based approach 
rather than a design based approach. Over thirty years ago, because of the Vietnam War and the use of 
napalm there was a trigger to adopt Protocol III and now white phosphorus can serve as the same 
stimulus to revisit the protocol. The advantages of doing so have been discussed and it has been 
argued that by taking an effects based approach greater humanitarian protection would be offered. 
White phosphorus is a very versatile munition and if used in the manner that it is by states then the 
principles of IHL are not being respected in a way that they should.  There is stigma to the munition, 
but it has not yet reached a level where not using the munition has become customary international 
law. There is also no way under the current definition of an incendiary weapon in which better 
humanitarian protection can be offered. It has been assessed to see if the current law could be 
interpreted in a different way but this does not appear to be possible. Considerations have been made 
to the limits of what sort of effects will be considered to need to occur for a munition to fit the scope 
of the protocol. The amendment that should be made in IHL has been found and discussed. The 
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answer to the question of the thesis has as a result been answered. This now leads to the concluding 
chapter of the thesis where all the issues will be rounded up to confirm the conclusion and also to 
follow up on any unanswered questions that have arisen as a result of the conclusion.  
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6. CONCLUSION  
6.1. OVERVIEW  
This thesis set out to show that Protocol III of the CCW should be amended to take an effect based 
approach rather than a design based approach. Chapter 5 concluded that this change should be made 
and the possible changes to do this were proposed. The law surrounding white phosphorus needs to be 
strengthened and the way to do this would be to amend the definition of incendiary weapons to be: 
‘Any weapon or munition which has the primary or secondary effect to set fire to objects or to 
cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, 
produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.’ 
This change is needed, and Chapter 2 showed the effects that white phosphorus has once it is 
deployed. White phosphorus is a toxic substance and has many possible serious effects.
183
 These 
effects are the same as an incendiary weapon and can be just as devastating to the victim  These 
effects are not different to a prohibited incendiary munition so there should be no reason why white 
phosphorus should not be regulated in the same way. White phosphorus is versatile and can have four 
distinct different purposes. This versatility means that it escapes regulation. Protocol III of the CCW 
currently defines an incendiary weapon as:  
'Any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn 
injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a 
chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.
184
' 
White phosphorus therefore does not fit within the scope of the protocol. If white phosphorus is to be 
used for its screening qualities then it has not been designed for its incendiary qualities. It can never 
be truly designed for one of its distinct purposes because it can always be used for a different purpose. 
Only the user of the munition truly knows what they are intending for the munition to be used for. The 
proposed changes would combat this loophole. It would not matter what the munition is being 
designed to be used for. If it can cause effects similar to an incendiary weapon then it will be 
prohibited. This would offer the most humanitarian protection and it upholds the principles and values 
of IHL. 
This was not the only possible amendment that was considered when reaching this conclusion. Other 
possibilities were also observed and discussed to see if better humanitarian protection could be 
offered and what the advantages and disadvantages of each would be. Chapter 3 considered the 
possibility of expanding liability when there is a violation in the law when using white phosphorus. 
This would ensure that more people are liable for their actions. The case of Zyklon B was discussed 
and compared to throughout the chapter. The chapter concluded by stating that even though it may be 
possible to do this, and a three part test was adopted it would not offer enough humanitarian 
protection. It may make more liable for their actions, but it would not help the victims of white 
phosphorus and there would still be a loophole in the law. In the case of Zyklon B it was easier to 
prosecute someone as it was only one party committing the crimes in one conflict. It would be much 
harder to implement this concept on a larger scale around the world and for many different conflicts. 
Expanding liability would not offer the best humanitarian protection possible and it was deemed that 
another change should be sought instead.  
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The next chapter looked at the CWC, and this convention prohibits states to develop, produce, 
acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons.
185
 If white phosphorus was to be classed as a 
chemical weapon then it would offer the utmost humanitarian protection as white phosphorus would 
no longer be able to be used in armed conflict. However, white phosphorus is not a chemical weapon 
as it is not specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those 
toxic chemicals. It was considered to see if it could be classed as one. As it could not, possible 
amendments to the convention were considered to see if it could also encompass white phosphorus in 
its definition. This amendment did not seem logical. Currently, the CWC is able to regulate peaceful 
uses of chemical weapons and balance this with the prohibition of illegitimate uses of chemicals. The 
OPCW is a fully functioning body that helps maintain the functioning of the CWC. For the CWC to 
take an effects based approach it would have to consider the toxicity of a chemical and this would be 
ambiguous. There are many factors that would have to be considered such as the quantity, time frame, 
severity of injury or how the chemical is administered. This would mean that it would be harder to 
balance the legitimate uses of chemicals against illegitimate uses. It would require a complete 
overhaul and this would not be beneficial. The general purpose criterion works well, and any change 
would be detrimental to the convention.  
With this amendment not possible, there was only the CCW left to assess. White phosphorus is not a 
new munition and has played a role in conflicts for many years. Amending the CCW to protect the 
law surrounding white phosphorus would be the best possible amendment. Stigma plays an important 
role in IHL as highlighted by the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The time to 
amend the law surrounding white phosphorus is now as there is a high level of stigma and controversy 
when white phosphorus is used in armed conflict. The use of the munition in the United States 
showed the justifications given for using the weapon. But the ever growing attention to white 
phosphorus did not stop, and the use of white phosphorus in Gaza shows the growing pressure that 
comes from using the munition. The fact finding mission, the Goldstone Report found that Israeli 
armed forces were systematically reckless in determining to use white phosphorus in built up areas. 
These issues were covered extensively compared to the Bosnian war when white phosphorus was 
used in the Siege of Sarajevo. The best time to amend law is when interest is high to do so and the 
stigma surrounding the weapon shows that the time is now. Loopholes such as the sole purpose 
criterion that was needed to be met for the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration in IHL have been dealt with 
in the past. There is no reason why a similar approach cannot be taken to amend the glaring loophole 
in Protocol III now. 
6.2. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Reaching this conclusion is important. It can act as a starting point for discussions to be made with the 
intention of offering better humanitarian protection for victims of white phosphorus. When discussion 
occurs, ideas can be developed and worked upon. By doing this, if there are any weaknesses then they 
can be advanced on. Protocol III has been recommended to consider also secondary effects, and even 
though there have been limits set as to what the secondary effects should be, this could still be further 
explored. By having a tight provision for what secondary effects are, then there will be little 
ambiguity. This thesis set out to argue that change should be made, and it introduced potential 
amendments. But this does not stop here, and this could be further developed. Now it has been 
deemed that an effects based approach is best, others can help contribute to what exactly this should 
be. The benefits and disadvantages of different possibilities can be discussed and built upon.  
The proposed changes suggested will not solve all the issues in regards to the white phosphorus 
munition. However, it is a start. It can and will alleviate suffering and offer better humanitarian 
protection. It would allow for white phosphorus to be classed as an incendiary weapon. Any way in 
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which this can be done should be a change that is considered. The values and principles of IHL are 
fundamental parts of IHL and are too important. They must be protected as much as possible. Hans 
Bethe stated: 
'If we fight a war and win it with H-bombs, what history will remember are not the ideals we were 
fighting for but the methods we used to accomplish them.
186’ 
This concept seems fitting to conclude the thesis. The values and principles of IHL are vital, and they 
should be protected as much as possible. The means and methods of warfare should not steer away 
from these principles, and the regulation of Protocol III does not regulate white phosphorus as well as 
it should do. There is a loophole in the protocol and multi-purpose munitions such as white 
phosphorus can be used in a way that can cause the same devastating effects as incendiary weapons 
which are prohibited. Change needs to be made and if better humanitarian protection can be offered 
then there should be change to do this. Protocol III of the CCW was created to protect people from the 
atrocities of incendiary weapons but it has fallen behind other areas of IHL. There is a glaring 
loophole and too much suffering has occurred because of its inadequate definition of incendiary 
weapons. Protocol III should take an effects based approach to strengthen the definition of incendiary 
weapons. The time to amend the law is now.  
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7. APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
7.1. WHAT IS WHITE PHOSPHORUS?   
The chemical element phosphorus is an allotropic element which has several forms. The most volatile, 
reactive and toxic form is white phosphorus which has a garlic like smell and is usually a colourless-
to-white waxy solid. The name white phosphorus derives from the Greek god and ‘bringer of light’ 
Eosphoros (transliteration from Εωσφορος).187 The namesake comes from the yellow-green 
chemiluminescent light that is produced when white phosphorus reacts with oxygen in air. 
The effects of being exposed to white phosphorus have led to its classification as a toxic substance.
188
 
Such effects and the varying degree of severity depend on factors such as the dose, the duration, how 
one is exposed, personal traits, and whether other chemicals are present.
189
 Cyanosis, abdominal pain, 
jaundice, shock, coma, death, liver damage, kidney damage, permanent damage to the eyes and severe 
burns are all possible effects. Even a burn that covers less than 10% of the body can be fatal if there 
has been damage to the liver, kidneys and heart.
190
 There are known possible effects from exposure to 
white phosphorus but there is still some degree of uncertainty. If white phosphorus enters the lungs of 
a person breathing air containing it, it is still not known if it will enter the blood or how it will leave 
the body.
191
 Once exposed to the skin of a person, instead of burning through a chemical reaction, it 
does so through the generation of high levels of heat
192
. The best way to put these effects into context 
is to look at a real life scenario. In June 2009, white phosphorus affected an eight year old girl named 
Razia. In Afghanistan in the Tagab Valley of Kapsia, two white phosphorus shells were deployed onto 
her house. Razia’s two sisters died from the blast as flames engulfed the house. Since the incident her 
father has said: 
‘The sound of the blast was very strong and I was almost unconscious. I couldn't think. My 
children were shouting at me: Wake up! You're burning.’193 
Razia survived the initial blast, but white phosphorus was exposed to her skin. Her hair was burned 
away and burns had reached her face, head, neck and arms. She was consequently rushed to hospital 
and in the operating room an oxygen mask was put on her face. Instantly, the mask began to melt 
away. Whenever the doctors attempted to scrape away the dead tissue on her body, flames would 
frequently reappear on her skin.  Razia had to endure over fifteen surgeries, but her skin will forever 
remain scarred, and her hair will never grow back. Deploying white phosphorus killed some of her 
family, and the effects to her own body will remain with her for a lifetime.
194
  
Even with such effects, due to white phosphorus being both highly flammable and pyrophoric, it does 
prove to be an effective and versatile munition.
195
 The differing uses of the munition can be grouped 
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into four distinct purposes.
196
 When used to illuminate, the burning causes a bright white light that can 
brighten large areas in the night. It can also be used to signal, in which the dense smoke produced 
from the munition can signal a target. Screening enables the smoke to hide any movement from 
people or vehicles. Finally, using the weapon for its incendiary capabilities allows setting areas or 
targets on fire.  There is an absence of a specific treaty dealing with the use of white phosphorus. This 
means that when the munition is used for one of its distinct purposes, it may deal with a different area 
of IHL compared to when it is used for another purpose. Fear of fire and burn injury is deeply 
embedded in the human psyche and there is also a great dislike towards incendiary weapons.
197
 
Treaties and conventions can work as a response to such views, so where Protocol III of the CCW 
prohibits the use of incendiary weapons, a weapon used to illuminate an area would not invoke similar 
prohibition. The use of white phosphorus could fit in the scope of a treaty that deals with incendiary 
weapons or one that concerns illuminate munitions. The treaties may differ, but it is the same weapon 
being used. There are illegal uses of the munition and it cannot be used for its incendiary qualities 
against for example human targets. There is no ambiguity in this instance. But it becomes ambiguous 
when it is being used in its legal way. As it is a multi-functional weapon, when it is being used legally 
it can still affect humans in the same way as its illegal use. The ambiguity arises as a consequence of 
the weapons different qualities being able to have the same effects where one is legal and the other is 
not.  
This is where the complexity of the use of white phosphorus as a munition comes into play. Its four 
distinct purposes are all very different. They offer different advantages and have their own 
weaknesses. However, most importantly, each use of the munition can be as destructive as the other. 
There can be some degree of control for the effects caused by the munition. If factors such as when 
the munition is used, where it is used and in what conditions it is deployed in are considered, then 
causalities can be limited. There is some degree of control that is possible as a densely populated area 
at night would produce fewer casualties compared to the middle of the city during the day. But the 
effects that it can cause when it is being used incorrectly can be destructive.  
When white phosphorus is being designed, it is likely done so in the knowledge that it could serve for 
any one of its capabilities. The manufacturer is aware that it could be later used for its incendiary, 
screening or illuminate qualities. With this notion, there is no sole primary purpose that the munition 
is being designed for. It is left to the discretion of the user to use the weapon for what purpose they 
desire. 
Regardless of what the purpose for using the weapon is, white phosphorous would be used in a M825 
shell. The shell is 155mm (6”1) and weighs around 50kg which then holds the white phosphorus 
inside the shell. When a shell is fired from a 155mm howitzer, its range can reach 3 to 18km. The 
white phosphorus would be released when the shell is around 50 to 250 metres above the ground. This 
activation occurs through a timed charge located at the front of the shell which releases 116 white 
phosphorus wedges. The white phosphorus is encased in a sealed canister in the shell, with 0.6 ounces 
of white phosphorus.
198
 This type of shell is used because it has great aerodynamic efficiency and it is 
able to separate into two parts which then releases the white phosphorus. 
Though the munition can reach an elliptical area of up to 200 meters, the trajectory of each individual 
wedge varies. Armed forces cannot manage this risk.
199
 Even though the effects of the munition can 
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be limited, once deployed there is no control. Wedges can from the force of the munition ricochet off 
its first impact point and hit another surface. This sort of trajectory has a very unpredictable and 
random nature. It increases the total coverage area that is affected and it cannot be controlled. Instead 
of ricocheting, an individual wedge can also penetrate a surface. If it hits a structure or window that is 
weak enough, the wedge can pierce through and cause damage from within and become trapped. The 
munition can also ignite and set fire to constructions. If white phosphorus makes contact with a 
combustible material, then it can act as a source of ignition and set the surrounding areas on fire.  
7.2. THE HISTORY OF WHITE PHOSPHORUS 
Fenian terrorists were the first to use white phosphorus as a weapon and did so in the 19
th
 century.
200
 
Fenian’s were part of a secret oath-bound fraternal organisation and they used white phosphorus in the 
form of a solution in carbon disulphide. After evaporation, the phosphorus would burst into flames 
and ignite. This use of white phosphorus and mixture was known as ‘Fenian fire.’  There were stories 
told of a 'type of wild fire that could not be put out by water, clung onto ones skin, and could climb up 
the side of ones vessel
201
.'  With the growing reputation of Fenian fire, it started to become more 
widely used. Extremists from the Industrial Workers of the World (commonly referred to as 
‘Wobblies’) in the early 20th Century too started to use white phosphorus as a means of achieving 
their goals.
202
  
The munitions rise to being more widely used around the world and primarily in warfare occurred 
during World War I and II. 1916 was the first year Britain introduced factories for the production of 
white phosphorus grenades. During the First World War, white phosphorus was used in munitions 
such as mortar bombs and rockets. However, during World War II when the invasion of Britain 
appeared imminent there was a suggestion from phosphorus firm 'Albright and Wilson' of Oldbury to 
use white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon.
203
  
It was suggested that white phosphorus be used in a similar way to how Fenian Fire was used as a 
weapon and this was consequently how Britain used white phosphors as an incendiary munition for 
the first time. It was officially known as the No. 76 Special Incendiary Grenade, but more commonly 
referred to as SIP (Self Igniting Phosphorus). The incendiary grenade originated from the United 
Kingdom and was produced over 6,000,000 times
204
.  After demonstrations of SIP, the Royal Air 
Force distanced themselves from the weapon stating they had no interest. The focal point of this 
stance came through safety concerns.  The first uses mainly were issued to the Home Guard and as an 
anti-tank weapon. The grenade itself could be thrown by hand or from a Northover projector. Its 
original use by the Home Guard is an interesting one. The Home Guard was a defence organisation 
during World War II for the British Army. It was made up of 1.5 million volunteers that were either 
too old or young to join the army, or otherwise ineligible.
205
 The objective of the organisation was to 
act as a second defence for Britain in case there was an invasion by Nazi forces whilst the primary 
British forces were fighting abroad. The Home Guard were poorly armed as most resources and 
weapons were given to British Army. This meant that the Home Guard’s inventory mainly consisted 
of weapons that were no longer needed by the British Army, weapons that they no longer desired or 
weapon that could be produced cheaply. The fact that the weapon was not needed or desired by the 
British Army is notable. There were great concerns to using the weapon, with much of it being down 
to safety. There was also great scepticism about the efficacy of SIP. After weapon designer Stuart 
Macrae observed a trial of SIP, he stated: 
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'There was some concern that, if the tank drivers could not pull up quickly enough and hop 
out, they were likely to be frizzled to death, but after looking at the bottles they said they 
would be happy to take a chance
206
.'  
If the British Army during one of the world’s greatest conflicts distanced themselves from white 
phosphorus, why is it so widely used now? White phosphorus munitions were regarded as extremely 
dangerous and were not deployed in combat. Caches of SIP were hidden by the Home Guard during 
the war in case of invasion and are to this day still being found and are still dangerous. 
Nonetheless gradually over time, the use of white phosphorus grew and its involvement in warfare 
became more widely used. It is reported that white phosphorus played a major role in breaking up 
German infantry attacks during the later parts of the Second World War. With its ever increasing use, 
the impact it had on civilians too grew. Areas with civilians such as Chongqing, London, Coventry, 
Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo were all affected. Incendiary bombs of white phosphorus were used by 
both the Allied and the Axis forces. They were used against civilian populations and especially areas 
that had military significance. For example an illustration of one of these attacks occurred on the 8
th
 of 
November 1940, as retaliation for an air attack by the Royal Air Force on Munich. 500 German 
bombers dropped white phosphorus on Coventry and 'virtually destroyed it.'
207
 The use of white 
phosphorus during World War II was mainly a way of bombing indiscriminately and on civilian 
populations.  There was an increase in munitions being used with incendiary effects, and this led to 
the creation and ratification of Protocol III of the CCW. Though this Convention deals with 
incendiary weapons and not specifically white phosphorus, it shows how progressively using weapons 
resulted in conventions being created to combat them. There has been a great increase in the use of 
white phosphorus in 21
st
 century warfare.
208
 The effects of white phosphorus and its issues have been 
discussed and there is a problem. The increasing use intensifies the necessity for better regulation.  
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Appendix B 
7.3. ZYKLON B 
Cellular respiration takes place in the cells of organisms that produces adenosine triphosphate (ATP). 
Preventing the human body from producing ATP is fatal. A human weighing just less than seventy 
kilograms would die within just a couple of minutes if they were to inhale 70mg of hydrogen 
cyanide.
209
 Hydrogen cyanide was originally discovered in the late 18
th
 century and in the 1880’s was 
used for fumigation. Originally used to fumigate citrus trees, it gradually spread to being used to 
fumigate ships, mills and good wagons as well.
210
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Appendix C 
7.4. THE CWC ARTICLES 
Article 1 of the CWC is very definitive. It presents a clear prohibition to chemical weapons. It states 
that each party to the convention under all circumstances are prohibited to do the following: 
‘(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, 
directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; 
(b) To use chemical weapons; 
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; 
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to 
a State Party under this Convention
211’ 
Article 2 of the same convention helps define some of the words of Article 1 and it sets the criteria 
needed for a chemical to fit within the scope of the convention. Where Article 1 expresses that the 
convention concerns chemical weapons, Article 2 defines what a chemical weapon is meant as: 
Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited 
under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; 
(b)Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the 
toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph(a), which would be 
released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; 
Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of 
munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b)
212
 
A toxic chemical is also stated to be defined under the convention as: 
‘Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, 
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such 
chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of 
whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.’213 
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Appendix D 
7.5. THE CWC SCHEDULES 
Schedule 1 chemicals have either none or little use outside being used for chemical weapons. 
Chemicals that would be found under Schedule 1 would be weapons such as sarin, mustard gas and 
tabun. Under Schedule 1, these chemicals are allowed to be produced for research or medical 
purposes. Any production of the chemicals above 100 grams per year needs to be declared to the 
OPCW and a state is limited to only being able to possess 1 tonne of these materials. These are very 
deadly chemicals and if there was to be an amendment to the CWC that focuses on effects of 
munitions then a similar exception would need to be made. 
Chemicals can also fall under Schedule Two and these are chemicals that have legitimate applications 
on a small scale. Manufacturing of these chemicals has to be declared and there are also restrictions 
on export to states that have not signed the CWC. An example of a chemical that applies is 
Thiodiglycol that can be legitimately be used as a solvent in inks, but also in the manufacture of 
mustard agents.  
The final grouping is Schedule 3, and a chemical under this classification has large scale uses when 
not being used in chemical weapons. If more than 30 tonnes per year is manufactured however, this 
must be declared so there can be an inspection. Similar to Schedule 2, there are restrictions on exports 
to states that have not signed the CWC. An example of a chemical that applies is phosgene which 
although can be used in chemical weapons, is a precursor in the manufacture of organic compounds. 
Similarly, Triethanolamine which can be used in chemical weapons can also be found in toiletries and 
detergents. 
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Appendix E 
7.6. THE CCW ARTICLES 
Article 1 of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol 
III) states that an incendiary weapon is to mean: 
‘Any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn 
injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a 
chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target’214 
The convention offers examples, and states that incendiary weapons can take the form of flame 
throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary 
substances. However, it also furthers the definition by stating what should not be classed as an 
incendiary weapon. The convention states that if the following can be applied to a munition, it is not 
to be classed as an incendiary weapon: 
‘(i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, 
smoke or signalling systems. 
(ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an 
additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, 
explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not 
specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military 
objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities.’215 
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